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ABSTRACT 
 
Three major banks have now admitted that their employees 
manipulated worldwide interest rates through the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (Libor), the most widely used interest rate index.  Libor is the 
interest rate term for trillions of dollars of swaps and loans, and its 
manipulation may have been used to extract billions of dollars.  These 
allegations come just as commodities manipulation law has been 
dramatically reformed and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) given vast new regulatory powers.  This Article provides the first 
extended, scholarly analysis of the CFTC’s new anti-manipulation rules.  
We consider the difficulty the rules address:  Commodities manipulation 
claims have traditionally faced nearly insuperable obstacles to success in 
prosecuting manipulations like that of Libor.  We then analyze the new 
rules, including their extension of the CFTC’s powers to cover the swap 
market.  The new rules appropriately lower the standards of pleading and 
proof, and yet the breadth of the new rules invites abuse.  Both to 
implement the new rules and to prevent overuse, we argue for more 
elaborate, sophisticated, and creative economic analysis than ever before.  
We provide a wide-ranging overview of empirical tools for assessing 
manipulation claims, while re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place 
of empiricism in the laws of evidence and intent.  We provide detailed 
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examples of how manipulation screens are necessary to complete the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s (Dodd-
Frank)’s revolution in manipulation law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Commodities manipulation claims have always been a mug’s game.
1
  
Lacking so much as a definition within any statute, rule, or case, the 
concept of commodities manipulation is profoundly confused.  Amidst the 
law’s confusion, advice from scholars varies.  There is no scholarly 
consensus as to the existence of manipulation, let alone the appropriate 
definition and avenue for prevention. 
What emerges from the confusion is an almost unwinnable set of 
burdens.  Plaintiffs must establish a manipulative intent that is conceptually 
and doctrinally among the most demanding mental state requirements 
anywhere in financial law.  Moreover, the evidence for such intent is 
typically only highly ambiguous public behavior.  Plaintiffs must also 
establish that the defendant’s conduct causally resulted in an “artificial 
price,” the definition of which is again confused and burdensome.  Worst 
of all, courts have often been hostile to the use of statistical and economic 
arguments in buttressing and evaluating manipulation claims. 
Unsurprisingly, the CFTC has won only one case in thirty-seven 
years.
2
  Private plaintiffs are likely to prefer to plead Sherman Act section 
2, which does not require a showing of intent, and which has long been 
amenable to economic analysis.  Even the Sherman Act’s challenging 
market power element is just one part of manipulation’s price artificiality 
element. 
Yet, all at once, dramatic manipulation reform has arrived.  The law 
governing market manipulation has been significantly altered:  language 
tracking securities fraud prohibitions has been added, an attempt prong 
incorporated, and the scope of manipulation extended to include reckless 
manipulative conduct. 
Also, under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC is instructed to regulate swaps, 
which are no longer exempt from the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).
3
  
 
 1.  See, e.g., Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on 
Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 391 (1991) (observing that “the 
seventy-year effort by the federal government to eliminate . . . market manipulations has 
been more or less unsuccessful”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures 
Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991). 
 2.  See Andrew N. Kleit, Index Manipulation, the CFTC, and the Inanity of DiPlacido 
(Am. Enter. Inst. Reg-Markets Working Paper No. 09-06, 2009) (explaining that the CFTC 
charged NYMEX floor broker Anthony DiPlacido and traders with Avista Energy with 
manipulation and attempted manipulation of settlement prices of the Palo Verde and 
California-Oregon Border electricity futures contracts traded on NYMEX from April 
through July of 1998).  Note, however, that the CFTC has settled many claims. 
 3.  Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, tit.VII (2010). 
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Dodd-Frank explicitly creates anti-manipulation rules that apply to swaps 
and commodities alike.
4
  With a mandate and significantly expanded anti-
manipulation authority under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has adopted potent 
new regulations to prosecute manipulation under the CEA.
5
  Although these 
new powers are broad and potentially dangerous, they are responding to 
increasing concern about the swap market. 
Regulation of swaps is of profound importance.  At least $500 trillion 
dollars in notional value are at stake in the global swap market.  This 
money has hitherto operated in a largely legally unaccountable space, 
uncleared and subject to opaque management; one need only remember the 
concerns at the time of the AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns 
failures to remember the systemic worries of swap failure.
6
 
Abuses in the swap market underlie today’s biggest financial story.  
Media, academics, consultants, regulators, and plaintiffs are increasingly 
focused on the $400 trillion dollar interest rate swap market as allegations 
surface that Libor, the benchmark for most of the world’s swaps,
7
 may have 
been manipulated.
8
  All over the world, major banks are admitting their 
employees’ complicity in one of the greatest financial heists in history.
9
  
Altering the interest rates paid by home mortgage borrowers and received 
by pension funds may have generated billions of dollars of illicit profits.  If 
Congress was content to allow commodities manipulation before, it has 
 
 4.  Id. § 753. 
 5.  Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices; Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 (July 14, 2011). 
 6.  See, e.g., Editorial, AIG and Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, at A26 
(suggesting that “[f]or the last year, the entire Beltway theory of the financial panic has been 
based on the claim that the ‘opaque,’ unregulated CDS market had forced the Fed to take 
over AIG and pay off its counterparties, lest the system collapse”). 
 7.  LIBOR: The world’s most important number, MONEYWEEK, Oct. 10, 2008, 
available at http://www.moneyweek.com/personal-finance/libor-the-worlds-most-importan 
t-number-13816; BBA LIBOR: The world’s most important number now tweets daily, BBA 
LIBOR, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-libor-the-
worlds-most-important-number-now-tweets-daily; Donald McKenzie, What’s in a Number?, 
30 LONDON REV. BOOKS 11 (2008) (noting that “Libor anchors contracts totaling about $300 
trillion, the equivalent of $45,000 for every human being on the planet”); cf. Carrick 
Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
16, 2008, at A1 (reporting that $500 trillion in contracts are indexed to Libor); INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS AND 
DELEVERAGING—MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY xv (2008) (observing that 
“the LIBOR rates are estimated to underpin some $400 trillion of financial derivatives 
contracts”). 
 8.  See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, 
WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1. 
 9.  Jean Eaglesham, Paul Vieira & David Enrich, Traders Manipulated Key Rate, 
Bank Says, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at C1. 
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signaled that commodities exchange prosecution is not to be dead letter.  
Swaps are simply too important and too relevant to slip through the cracks. 
In response to these dramatic events and shifts in the legal landscape, 
this Article makes three principal contributions.  It serves as the first 
scholarship to examine and explain the new CEA anti-manipulation 
powers.  In explicating these provisions, this Article explains the 
deficiencies the new provisions were meant to address, as well as the 
shortcomings and risks of the new manipulation rules.  Second, it urges the 
increased use of statistical and economic tools in the evaluation of 
manipulation claims, arguing for their particular importance in this domain.  
Third, it provides examples of how courts have used such tools, and how 
they might best use them in the future.  
The structure of the Article is as follows.  In Part I, we explore and 
define manipulation.  We then examine the law and theory of commodities 
manipulation as it existed prior to Dodd-Frank.  In Part II, we explain the 
changes within and attendant to Dodd-Frank and provide a rationale for 
some of the most controversial parts of these reforms, including a lowered 
scienter requirement.  In Part III, we then urge increased use of statistical 
and economic tools in the evaluation of manipulation claims, particularly at 
the pleading stage.  These screens should be used offensively and 
defensively.  Many manipulation schemes will be initially detected only by 
screens.  Conversely, courts may wish to spare defendants the expense of 
discovery where there is scanty statistical evidence of manipulation.  This 
will help limit the intimidating reach of the new rules.  In the process, we 
give extensive examples of how these screens might work, based both on 
theory and on our professional experiences. 
Arguments about the appropriate weight that should be given to 
empirical analyses in litigating intent belong to the genetic code of 
evidence law and scholarship.
10
  They can delve into the deep weeds of 
statistical detail, but they are ultimately disputes as to the epistemology of 
courts and agencies—arguments about how it is possible for a fact finder to 
know the facts upon which a judgment must ultimately rest.  This Article 
 
 10.  Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673 
(1986); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal 
Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978); Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A 
Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); John Kaplan, 
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Jonathan J. 
Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the 
Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 (1990); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:57 PM 
362 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
re-engages that debate from within manipulation law.  It demonstrates both 
the law’s current uses—often appropriate, and sometimes grudging—of 
empirical methods of establishing the four elements commonly associated 
with manipulation by providing an explication of the prominent uses of 
these methods in important litigation.  Particularly with regard to intent, 
statistical and econometric methods are of greater importance to 
establishing or discrediting a plaintiff’s case than many expect. 
I. MANIPULATION BEFORE DODD-FRANK: INSUPERABLE 
A. Definitions of Manipulation 
The dysfunctional state of pre-Dodd Frank anti-manipulation law is 
perhaps best reflected in the statutory, doctrinal, and scholarly confusion 
concerning the concept of manipulation itself.  Below we canvass this 
muddled territory.  The CEA makes it a felony “to manipulate or attempt to 
manipulate the price of . . . any commodity . . . .”
11
 and creates a private 
right of action to accompany the government’s civil and criminal 
enforcement capabilities.
12
  Yet no statute, regulation, or case defines 
manipulation for the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act.
13
 
According to Williams, “[t]he reason the Congress, the ABA, and the 
courts have not crafted an all-encompassing definition of ‘manipulation’” is 
because “[t]he concept is a constantly evolving one.”
14
  Others give a more 
pessimistic diagnosis:  want of a definition has left the law “a murky 
miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect.”
15
  
 
 11.  7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
 12.  Id. § 22(a); id. § 25(a)(1) (“Any person . . . who violates this chapter or who 
willfully aids . . . a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from 
one or more of the transactions referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this 
paragraph and caused by such violation . . . .”).  It was not always clear that there would be 
such a private right.  See PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES 
REGULATION 1462 (2d. ed. 1989). 
 13.  See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, at 27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (explaining that 
“[n]either manipulation nor attempted manipulation is defined in the Commodity Exchange 
Act.  That task has fallen to case-by-case judicial development”); cf. Prohibition on Price 
Manipulation, supra note 5, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41406-07 (“The Commission declines to adopt 
comments proposing a new economics-based definition of manipulation.  Instead, as stated 
above, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered in determining whether a 
violation of final Rule 180.1 exists.”); Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.) 
(declining to define manipulation), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 654 (1933). 
 14.  JEFFREY C. WILLIAMS, MANIPULATION ON TRIAL: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE 
HUNT SILVER CASE xviii (1995). 
 15.  2 TIMOTHY J. SNIDER, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS 
MARKETS 12.01, at 12-5 (2d ed. 1995); see also Edward T. McDermott, Defining 
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With no determinative account, administrative and judicial opinions 
offer a grab bag of accounts of manipulation.  In In re Henner, the hearing 
officer’s opinion stated that: 
“Manipulation” is a vague term used in a wide and inclusive 
manner, possessing varying shades of meaning, and almost 
always conveying the idea of blame-worthiness deserving of 
censure.  There is usually also an implication of artificiality and 
of skillful and ingenious management.  In its most common use it 
has reference to a speculator, or to a group of speculators who 
buy or sell produce, in such a way as to give outsiders the 
impression that such buying or selling is the result of natural 
forces.  Hence the term includes excessive speculation, the 
spreading of false rumors, the working of syndicates to increase 
or depress prices, “wash sales,” “matched orders,” and 
“corners.”
16
 
All of these notions—blameworthiness, artificiality, speculation, false 
impressions and rumors, collusion to affect price, and specific practices—
are associated with manipulation, and each has held prominence in legal 
theory and in the law at some point. 
Scholars and observers have been encouraged to offer definitions, and 
resulting interpretations of the state of the law, but the only ground of 
agreement has proved to be the difficulty of proving manipulation.  As one 
scholar has put it, “Manipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a line 
between healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved 
to be too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory 
tool.”
17
 
A recurrent theme is the identification of manipulation with distorted 
or unnatural prices.
18
  The former president of the New York Cotton 
Exchange at Congressional hearings on cotton price fluctuations defined 
manipulation as: 
 
Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures “Squeeze,” 74 NW. U. L. REV. 
202, 205 (1979) (calling manipulation law “an embarrassment—confusing, contradictory, 
complex, and unsophisticated”). 
 16.  30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (U.S.D.A. 1971). 
 17.  Lower, supra note 1, at 392; Craig Pirrong, Squeezes, Corpses, and the Anti-
Manipulation Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 REGULATION, no. 4, 1994 at 
54 (“[T]o define just what manipulation means. . . . is a more difficult task than one might 
think, because the term ‘manipulation’ is used very imprecisely and indiscriminately.”). 
 18.  For artificiality in antitrust, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150, 223 (1940) (“[M]anipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial 
stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts those 
prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition 
alone.”). 
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[A]ny and every operation or transaction or practice, the purpose 
of which is not primarily to facilitate the movement of the 
commodity at prices freely responsive to the forces of supply and 
demand; but, on the contrary, is calculated to produce a price 
distortion of any kind in any market either in itself or in its 
relation to other markets.
19
 
Likewise, Matthijs Nelemans has examined the connection between the 
action and price pressure.
20
 
Easterbrook is critical of efforts to find manipulation in artificial 
prices: 
An effort to isolate which “forces of supply and demand” are 
“basic” and which are not is doomed to failure.  What is a “basic” 
demand?  Economists think of supply and demand as givens.  
People demand what they demand, and never mind the reasons 
why. . . .  There is no way to say what demand is real and what is 
artificial.
21
 
Against objective accounts,
22
 he proposes a subjective account that 
emphasizes deceitful intent, a position several scholars share.
23
 
Yet, there are problems with deceit-based accounts as well.  It seems 
that some manipulation comes not from deceit, but from some exercise of 
market power.  Pirrong and Russo both note that some manipulation 
concerns “the elimination of effective price competition in a market for 
cash commodities and/or futures contracts through the domination of 
supply or demand, and the exercise of that domination to intentionally 
 
 19.  Markham, supra note 1, at 312; see also Cotton Prices: Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 70th Cong. 201-03 (1928) 
(asserting that Marsh’s statement provides little guidance in defining manipulation); Wendy 
Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 345, 360 (1987) (explaining that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the 
legislative history regarding the meaning of manipulation, and that Marsh’s statement offers 
a “particularly unreliable reflection of congressional understanding”). 
 20.  See Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1169 (2008) (describing how manipulation is creating superfluous “price pressure”). 
 21.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures 
Markets, 59 J. BUS. S103, S117 (1986). 
 22.  It should surprise no reader to find accounts that emphasize both artificiality and 
intentions of the manipulator.  See Christopher L. Gilbert, Manipulation of Metals Futures: 
Lessons from Sumitomo 3 (London Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Discussion Paper No. 
1537, 1997) (describing how manipulation can be best deterred). 
 23.  See Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market 
Manipulation Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1135 (2011) (calling an attempt 
to define manipulation to include profitable trading with bad intent “most thorough and 
satisfying”). 
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produce artificially high or low prices.”
24
 
Some scholars deemphasize intent, focusing on objective 
characteristics of manipulation.  Van Smith argues for a presumption of 
manipulation where traders do not offset their contracts before delivery.
25
  
Perdue offers conduct-oriented definition of manipulation “as conduct that 
would be uneconomical or irrational, absent an effect on the market 
price.”
26
  Friedman follows Perdue by comparing the trader’s act to his 
behavior without manipulative intent.  He does so by comparing the 
behavior to “what the long [trader] would have done if he simply did not 
take the anticipated impact into account,” and then, “what the long [trader] 
would have done had he put out of mind the additional pressure created by 
a system of punitive sanctions for default.”
27
 
Of course, the more basic question is whether there is such a thing as 
manipulation at all.  Fischel and Ross believe “legal prohibitions are 
unnecessary” in the futures markets.
28
  They claim that no objective test can 
detect manipulation, and all subjective tests that find manipulation also find 
fraud.
29
  As a result, there is no manipulation beyond what the law of fraud 
can already address.  They are skeptical as to the existence of whole 
categories of putative manipulation, asserting that they are likely to be self-
deterring.  The need to make prices rise through trading, but only after the 
manipulator has acquired the commodity “creates an intractable dilemma 
for the potential manipulator.”
30
  The trading behavior that drives up prices 
for others drives up prices for the manipulator too, who must also face 
transaction costs. 
They further emphasize that manipulation requires deployment of 
huge amounts of capital,
31
 that large positions are already largely prohibited 
by law,
32
 and that exchanges have an incentive to prevent manipulation.
33
  
With no gainful manipulation detectable that is not fraud, Fischel and Ross 
 
 24.  2 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON, Commodities Regulation § 5.03, at 238 (1982); Craig 
Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY 
L.J. 1, 6 (2010). 
 25.  M. Van Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To 
Deliver or Not to Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1605-06 (1981). 
 26.  Perdue, supra note 19, at 348.  Perdue also draws parallels to the antitrust concept 
of predatory pricing.  Id. at 394. 
 27.  Richard D. Freidman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market 
Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 30, 59 (1990). 
 28.  Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in 
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 548 (1991). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 513. 
 31.  Id. at 513. 
 32.  Id. at 549. 
 33.  Id. 
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urge an end to the definitional and regulatory enterprise. 
Fischel and Ross’s manipulation nihilism is not the end of the 
discussion:  Steve Thel responded that far more can alter price than fraud 
and fictitious trades.
34
  For example, a broad category of contract-based 
trades, such as executive compensation agreements, may be triggered by 
changes in external prices.  If the payoff from the contract is great enough, 
it can be rational for a contractor to bid up the price of the asset.
35
  This 
manipulation is plausible and does not seem to be fraud. 
B. Common Types of Manipulation 
If it is challenging to find scholarly consensus on the proper definition 
of manipulation, it must suffice to define manipulation ostensibly, by 
pointing out several examples that are broadly accepted as manipulation, if 
only because the CEA does the same.  It specifically prohibits 
“bucket[ing]” an order,
36
 “wash sale[s],” and “accommodation trade[s].”
37
  
An effort to compile an exhaustive list of different manipulative schemes is 
likely to be incomplete since “[t]he methods and techniques of 
manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”
38
  That said, three 
main categories of manipulation are broadly accepted:  delivery 
impairment, false information, and market rigging.
39
 
Delivery impairment includes cases that exploit disruptions in the 
delivery mechanisms, often by dominating or interfering with the supply of 
a cash commodity.  Such manipulations are possible in commodities 
markets because of the relationship between the “cash” or “spot” market 
and the futures market.  The cash market represents a purchase or sale of 
the existing commodity, while the futures market represents a promise to 
buy or sell in the future.  Most futures contracts are cash settled, meaning 
the commodity is never delivered—the contract owner agrees to accept the 
value of the commodity instead.  However, the contract owner, or “the 
long,” usually has the right to demand physical delivery of the commodity, 
forcing her counterparty to purchase the commodity on the cash market.  
When the cash market is in some way impaired, and so delivery is 
impracticable, “the short” will have few options but to accept unfavorable 
 
 34.  Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  7 U.S.C. § 6B(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012). 
 37.  Id. § 6C(a)(2)(A). 
 38.  Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 39.  2 THOMAS A. RUSSO, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURE AND OPTIONS 
MARKETS § 12.11, at 12-18 (1983). 
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terms of delivery or settlement.  To make a stylized example, a short in the 
oil futures market may promise to deliver ten barrels of oil in a year to the 
long for $100 per barrel.  That may seem like a fine deal if oil is currently 
trading for $90 per barrel.  The short expects to settle her contract either 
with cash or by buying oil at the market price and then delivering it in 
satisfaction of her contract.  However, it may be that the long insists on 
delivery at precisely the time that there are only five barrels for sale within 
easy shipment of the point of delivery.  The short is in a bind; to satisfy her 
contract, she must contemplate transporting oil from far away at great cost.  
With local delivery so impaired, she may be willing to pay the long an 
attractive premium to satisfy her contract and, in any event, to pay a king’s 
ransom for the five barrels that are available for delivery. 
Squeezes and corners are two well-known delivery impairment 
scenarios.  A corner is a kind of manipulation in which someone, taking 
advantage of the anonymity of futures trading, establishes a large [long] 
futures position calling for delivery in a particular delivery month.  Waiting 
until those who have the contractual obligation for delivery have little time 
remaining, the cornerer surprises them by appearing eager to stand for 
delivery.  Meanwhile, having obtained much of the deliverable grade 
locally available, the manipulator leaves those committed to make delivery 
the unenviable choice of paying express charges for transportation or 
buying back the futures contracts at a premium.
40
 
While in a corner, the trader has control of virtually all of the 
available supply of the commodity underlying the futures contracts held by 
the trader,
41
 in a squeeze a trader acquires a large futures position when 
there is a shortage of the underlying commodity.
42
  A squeeze occurs in the 
futures market alone, whereas a corner also involves manipulation in the 
 
 40.  WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 6; see also Gilbert, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that 
“[t]he terms corner and squeeze tend to be used synonymously, but it is nevertheless useful 
to follow Kyle (1984) in distinguishing between them.  The crux of Kyle’s distinction is 
whether the manipulator takes positions on the underlying physical market to create an 
artificial shortage (a corner), usually in conjunction with futures market positions; or 
whether he operates solely in the futures market but exploits the delivery mechanism to 
distort the price of a particular future away from fundamental values (a squeeze).  Squeezes, 
he notes, are over once delivery is made, while corners tend to last longer”). 
 41.  Markham, supra note 1, at 283. 
 42.  Id. at 284 n.8 (“[A] squeeze may be intentionally created or it may result from a 
natural shortage that traders seek to exploit.  The latter event is frequently referred to as 
‘congestion.’”) (citing REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
ADMINISTRATION 40 (Sept. 25, 1939)).  Further, a corner is unique in that the long party 
must “bury the corpse” (sell off the commodity) afterwards without depressing prices and 
rendering the corner unprofitable.  Markham, supra note 1, at 294 (“[An] FTC study found 
that congestion has price effects nearly as severe as a corner that is deliberately contrived to 
squeeze the shorts.”). 
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cash market.
43
  That is to say that a squeeze is possible where the 
manipulator has taken no long or short positions in the underlying 
commodity. 
Delivery impairment strategies often require substantial amounts of 
capital and staying power, as well as tolerance for risk.  If delivery proves 
easier than the manipulator guessed, then she may find herself receiving 
large supplies for which she has no use, and without enjoying a substantial 
price effect.  For this reason, asymmetric information can be the 
manipulator’s ally.  A corner or squeeze is easier if the manipulator knows 
that delivery is likely to be impaired at some point.
44
 
The second category of manipulative conduct, the spreading of false 
information, involves the indirect disruption of supply and demand by 
creation of a state of misinformation in the market place.  Large amounts of 
buying or selling may sometimes send false signals to market participants 
that they too should buy or sell, but this is an expensive and unreliable 
technique.
45
 More common procedures are the dissemination of false 
information or impressions through rumors or price reports, or “wash 
sales”—transactions with one’s self or affiliates with no economic 
substance.  Such manipulation requires little to no capital and tends to be 
relatively short-lived, as the market self-corrects. 
The last type of manipulation, which we may call market rigging, 
involves attempts by market professionals to tamper with the market by 
virtue of their position within the system of trade.  For example, prices 
could be artificially high because brokers simply execute at an artificially 
high price to the disservice of their clients.  This type of manipulation 
generally depends upon some or all of the following factors:  lack of 
market liquidity (however short-term), conspiracy or at least tacit 
acceptance by a substantial number of market professionals, and some 
defect in the future’s contract terms or some inefficiency in the cash market 
such that delivery of cash commodity is not practical.  We may also include 
front-running, when a broker, having just received a large incoming 
transaction, trades on his own account in order to profit from the effects of 
a subsequent execution of the client order. 
Many kinds of manipulation include elements from more than one of 
these general manipulative strategies.  For example, a delivery impairment 
manipulation may be easier if one spreads false information about one’s 
 
 43.  RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12-10. 
 44.  Markham notes that Hedgers and Speculators are equally likely to engage in 
manipulative trades as shown by the Ferruzzi soybean crisis.  Markham, supra note 1, at 
372; see also Craig Pirrong, Detecting Manipulation in Futures Markets: The Ferruzzi 
Soybean Episode, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28 (2004). 
 45.  See Fischel & Ross, supra note 28, at 512. 
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own position.  Secrecy is important, as people know that it is dangerous to 
promise to deliver wheat to someone who already owns most of the 
deliverable wheat.  If a trader did enter the contract by accident and found 
out about supply conditions, she could bring new supplies to the market 
(say, making arrangements for new wheat to be grown and delivered) to 
reduce the premium she must pay to cancel her obligations.  The 
manipulator will profit most if he can keep the trader from realizing her 
predicament.
46
 
Another mixed strategy may be found in a short-squeeze, which aims 
to depress prices to artificially low levels.  In this instance, the manipulator 
becomes the short in a number of future contracts and then places into 
delivery a very large amount of the cash commodity.  Not only does the 
dump of cash commodity onto the market tend to depress the value of the 
commodity, and therefore help the short contract, it also gives her an 
opportunity to threaten to actually deliver the commodity in the future.  A 
large number of commodity traders may not actually want to own the 
commodity; they may be pure speculators, or perhaps they are using the 
commodity as a proxy for some other hedging purpose.  For example, a 
farmer, afraid that synthetic fertilizer costs may go up with energy prices, 
could buy oil futures without actually wanting to receive oil.  If she is 
forced to take delivery, she is likely to sell the oil quickly.  If the 
manipulation is successful, a selling spree may be touched off by longs 
rushing to liquidate or retender deliveries received at increasingly lower 
prices.
47
  A short-squeeze may be difficult to carry out because it often 
requires substantially more capital than long manipulations and is unaided 
by development of natural conditions such as natural squeeze.
48
  A crucial 
risk in the short squeeze is the possibility of large longs in the market with 
the capacity to “stop” delivery (i.e., take delivery of the physical 
commodity).  If the short dumps cheap oil into the market, but someone is 
ready to receive the oil, the short will lose substantially. 
C. Legal Standard of Manipulation 
For all that, the law has long prohibited manipulation.  It is common to 
say, with the CFTC, that four elements make up a CEA manipulation:  (1) a 
manipulative act or omission; (2) intent; (3) causation; and (4) artificial 
 
 46.  Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S106. 
 47.  In re Hohenberg Bros., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
20271, at 21477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977) (quoting THOMAS A. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF 
FUTURES TRADING 309 (1971)). 
 48.  RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-16. 
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price.
49
  Commodities manipulation law has not looked to fraud or 
deception directly, unlike the securities regime.  Instead, this four-part test 
focuses on market-power manipulation, typically the result of trading. 
The legal and evidentiary standards for these elements are, in large 
part, the subject of subsequent sections (other than manipulative acts, 
which we considered, in part, above).  It is common for investigations and 
trials to concentrate on causation and artificiality of price together, on the 
one hand, and intent on the other.  This section elaborates the ways in 
which these standards are implemented with an emphasis on the use of 
econometric proof. 
1. Price Artificiality and Causation 
Price artificiality has been called the sine qua non of manipulation.
50
  
An artificial price is one that does not “reflect basic forces of supply and 
demand.”
51
  Where prices are artificial, they do not reflect all possible 
market factors and create “conditions which prevent the futures market 
from performing its basic economic function and hence [diminish] its 
utility to those members of the trade and general public who rely on its 
basic purposes.”
52
  But manipulations that fail to create an artificial price 
have generally not been a concern since, “[i]t is generally considered that 
none of [the evils of manipulation] occur absent distorted or artificial 
prices.”
53
 
Artificiality has been essential, in part, to focus enforcement where 
harm has been done.  The manipulator must have caused the artificial price, 
but she need not be the singular cause of the artificial price:  “It is enough, 
for purposes of a finding of manipulation in violation of section 6(b) and 9 
of the [A]ct, that respondents’ action contributed to the price 
[movement].”
54
 
 
 49.  In re Cox, [1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786 at 34,061 
(CFTC July 15, 1987); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. 
Supp. 2d. 513, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); RUSSO, supra note 39, at §12-11.  As pointed out 
below, the respondent does not have to be culpable of the entire difference between artificial 
and the market prices that would have prevailed under manipulation.  In re Kosuga, 19 
Agric. Dec. 603, 624 (U.S.D.A. 1960). 
 50.  Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis 
and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 956 (1994). 
 51.  Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), quoted in WILLIAMS, 
supra note 14, at 6. 
 52.  Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1158. 
 53.  RUSSO, supra note 39, at §12-22. 
 54.  Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 483 (1953) (“[F]resh eggs 
sell at a reasonably constant premium of considerable size over cash refrigerator eggs and 
refrigerator futures, and that, generally, the prices of cash refrigerator eggs and refrigerators 
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Although some scholars question the coherence of a notion of 
“artificial price,”
55
 all agree that artificiality is not self-evident.  Hence, 
from the beginning, artificiality was in need of proof and courts have often 
allowed use of econometric analysis.  In Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, a classic 
corner in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in bushels of wheat, the 
plaintiff’s expert proposed four tests for artificial prices characteristic of a 
squeeze,
56
 three of which constitute an historical analysis of past price 
movements
57
:  (i) analyzing the allegedly artificial price movement in light 
of price movements in the past nine years; (ii) comparing the spread 
between the allegedly manipulated future and the next closest future and 
comparing its movement to spreads over the previous nine years; (iii) 
evaluating the exchange traded futures prices with equal futures on other 
exchanges as compared to prior years; and (iv) determining the relationship 
between the allegedly manipulated future close to delivery with cash 
prices.
58
 
The price artificiality inquiry need not be limited just to price trends:  
The viability of manipulation often depends on the knowledge of market 
participants and the structure of the market.  Judge Easterbrook explains 
the Court’s decision in finding Cargill liable for manipulation:  “Cargill had 
used its special knowledge to advantage—it profited not because it knew 
more about the demand and supply of wheat in the cash market but because 
it alone knew who owned the deliverable wheat in Chicago.”
59
 
Judge Easterbrook goes on to point out the simultaneity of price spikes 
 
futures will reflect precipitous drops in the prices of fresh eggs. This testimony was 
corroborated by statistics dealing with these relative prices during the years 1932-1947.”).  
Russo points out that the court neglected to subject the statistics to any significance tests.  
RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12-26. 
 55.  Easterbrook, supra note 21. 
 56.  The CFTC in In re Indiana Farm Bureau overturned a prior court decision stating 
that the “historical price comparisons of the type relied upon by the courts in Cargill and 
G.H. Miller are of limited probative value here because of the unique combination of 
circumstances which led to the price rise in the corn pit on July 20, 1973.”  In re Indiana 
Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). 
 57.  The same comparisons were also suggested in a FTC study of manipulation in the 
grain market. 5 FTC, Report on the Grain Trade 27, 52 (1921).  It is noted that “[t]he 
existence of a corner may not, however, be completely revealed by this methodology 
because other markets may reflect to some degree the effects of the corner.”  Markham, 
supra note 1, at 294. 
 58.  If the futures market is functioning properly, at the close of trading in the futures, 
the price of the futures will correspond closely to the price of the cash wheat that will satisfy 
delivery (Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154).  This concept is also known as the 
convergence of the basis to zero upon expiration.  See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, 
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 23, 75 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining the convergence phenomenon). 
 59.  Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S119. 
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and a large long open position does not necessarily constitute fraud and is 
therefore not considered manipulation if other traders knew about the open 
position.  Similarly, Markham points to a Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) study where “it [is] noted that natural squeezes and corners 
generally relate to the peculiarities of the futures markets rather than to 
supply and demand conditions,”
60
 reinforcing the need for detailed 
economic analysis on the but-for price to assist in the determination of an 
artificial price, and on the possible causes of such effect.  Indeed, Judge 
Easterbrook suggests some of the analyses that an economist should 
undertake when dealing with an alleged manipulation.  He writes: 
Someone searching for manipulation might look for asymmetric 
information.  He also might look for the telltale sign of sudden 
price fluctuations.  When the closing price on a futures contract 
significantly diverges from the price of the cash commodity 
immediately before and after, this is strong evidence that 
someone has reduced the accuracy of the market price and 
inflicted real economic loss on participants in the market.  Courts 
usually look for both concealment and sudden swings in price.
61
 
In 1953, in Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan,
62
 the 
court found manipulation on the grounds that egg futures prices did not 
drop to a normal relationship with fresh eggs and other egg prices.
63
  The 
court looked at three instances to show that prices had been manipulated 
and were artificially high.  First, the government showed that the supply of 
refrigerated eggs in the allegedly manipulated December 1947 contract was 
higher than it had been in two previous months as well as in December of 
1946.  It further showed that real demand, as opposed to technical demand 
created by a cornering operation, was lower in December 1947 than in the 
previous months.  The court rejected the foregoing evidence stating that the 
government failed to prove similar market conditions and prices in the 
comparative months.  Second, the plaintiff provided evidence of the 
historical spread relationships between December and January futures at 
the close of trading in the December futures during the years 1932-1948 
(excluding some observations where price controls were in effect) and 
compared it to the allegedly manipulated December 1947 futures.  Third, 
the court looked at the excessive premium of cash to futures eggs in light of 
a historical constant premium that existed even during volatile price 
episodes.
64
  In this case, proof that prices were manipulated or artificially 
 
 60.  Markham, supra note 1, at 294. 
 61.  Easterbrook, supra note 21, at S118. 
 62.  201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953). 
 63.  Id. at 482-83. 
 64.  Id. 
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enhanced was perhaps the main issue in the entire proceeding. 
In In re Compania Salvadorena de Café, collusive manipulation was 
found when Salvadorena took delivery of about eighty-four percent of July 
1977 coffee contracts.  The Commission argued that objective measures 
found that Salvadorena did not actually need cash coffee and compared 
coffee prices to relevant benchmarks in similar coffee futures.
65
  The 
administrative law judge concluded that an artificial price resulted from 
these activities because the July contract prices exceeded the International 
Coffee Organization indicator price for coffee of equivalent grade and 
contemporaneous prices for the September 1977 contracts.  As one of the 
coauthors of this Article, Ms. Abrantes-Metz, has explained in a previous 
paper: 
In the silver manipulation episode of 1979-1980 by the Hunt 
Brothers, nine economists (seven of which testified) prepared 
reports on the silver market.  Defense side experts opined on the 
political and economic interpretation of the rise in prices, and 
presented analyses on the prices in silver futures for distant 
delivery dates as evidence that the price would have been high 
with the Hunts trading.  Evidence on price relationships, 
comparing silver to other metals including gold and bullion to 
coins was also presented on the defense side.  A variety of tests 
for price artificiality and causation were applied, for example by 
comparing silver and gold prices and using “Granger-causality” 
tests to determine whether the trading in silver had influenced 
gold.  The defendants used an econometric model to distinguish 
the Hunts’ trading from other possible influences on silver by 
relating the daily changes in their positions to the daily changes 
in the prices of silver, and found no statistically significant effect 
from the Hunts’ trading.  They also presented correlations among 
bullion price to show the geographic extent of the market and 
introduced evidence on price relationships from several other 
markets.
66
 
The plaintiff’s economic experts presented statistical studies of silver 
prices to comparisons of the Hunts’ futures position with bullion in 
 
 65.  “Salvadorena had a policy of using the futures market to help support coffee prices 
during at least 1976 and 1977 . . . .  Salvadorena, the National Federation of Columbian 
Coffee Growers, the Mexican Coffee Institute, and the Brazilian Coffee Institute had 
contributed funds to support coffee prices.” In re Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,886 (CFTC 1983) (citation omitted). 
 66.  Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Defending Against Allegations of Fraud and 
Manipulation:  The Role of the Economist under the New CFTC Rules (Jan. 9, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1982302. 
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exchange-approved vaults.  Attention was also drawn to specific acts, such 
as the deliverables taken, as evidence of manipulative intent.  The 
plaintiff’s experts analyzed the following indicators, which they argued 
flagged manipulation:  the silver/gold ratio, the coin/bullion differential, the 
price spread with more distant delivery dates, and the variability of prices. 
Williams presents a very detailed description of all of the economic 
and empirical analyses performed, their advantages, and limitations.
67
  
Economists presented analyses addressing all of the relevant four-part tests 
of manipulation, and as Williams describes: 
The two weeks that the economists spent before the jury 
represented the lengthiest testimony except for that of the Hunts 
themselves.  The economist expert witnesses addressed all the 
key aspects of any civil case, namely the nature of the offense, 
the defendants’ intent to commit the offense, the causal 
connection between the defendants’ actions and the damage to 
the plaintiff, and the monetary valuation of that damage.  The 
economists spoke to the “ultimate issue”: Did the Hunts 
manipulate the silver market?”
68
 
At the end, Judge Morris E. Lasker had few doubts in determining that the 
Hunts and their allies were the cause of the skyrocket pricing pattern 
observed.  Prior to the Hunt Brothers’ episode, it was thought that the silver 
market was too large to be manipulated, but this decision showed that the 
Hunts accomplished what previously had been thought to be not feasible. 
Turning from silver to copper, Gilbert suggests that when searching 
for manipulation “one may look for distortions in the futures price structure 
(ie the term structure of futures prices) which are not explicable in terms of 
seasonality.”
69
  Backwardation, defined as a negative value for the 
difference between the futures price of a contract and the cash price for the 
same commodity, has been identified as potentially indicative of 
manipulation.  Though backwardation can never be conclusive evidence of 
manipulation, “if a market becomes abnormally prone to move into 
backwardation, manipulation may be presumed.”
70
  Under backwardation, 
there tends to be a high basis (structure) variability resulting in a poorer 
 
 67.  WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 100-60. 
 68.  Id. at 12. 
 69.  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6; see also RUSSO, supra note 39 § 12-23, (“Although the 
maximum price difference for more distant months over nearby months is a virtual certainty, 
the reverse is not always the case. When a severe shortage of deliverable commodities 
exists, whether for natural reasons or because the market prices are being manipulated, the 
arbitraging activities of commercial users described above are inhibited and the cash and 
nearby futures trade at premiums over subsequent delivery months.”).  Note that such a 
convention only applies to non-perishable commodities. 
 70.  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 7. 
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quality hedge.  Of course, other circumstances could cause high volatility 
in prices and consequent backwardation.  It follows that if stocks (supplies) 
are sufficiently available, backwardation would be unexpected.  Gilbert 
states that only under these circumstances would highly variable 
backwardation be indicative of manipulation.  Vice versa, “it is difficult to 
distinguish attempted manipulations from successful speculation in a bull 
market.”
71
 
Gilbert uses the Sumitomo episode regarding an alleged manipulation 
of copper in the 1990’s on the London Metal Exchange (LME) to conclude 
that an observed stark backwardation in the futures term structure is 
potentially indicative of manipulation.
72
  In the case of Sumitomo, 
manipulation was alleged to have lasted for a period of over six years, and 
the CFTC also alleged that backwardation was so extensive and long-
lasting on the LME that copper supplies moved from the COMEX 
warehouse in Arizona to the LME warehouse in California.
73
  Furthermore, 
the CFTC argued that arbitrage trading and other factors linked trading of 
copper on the COMEX with that on the LME and Sumitomo’s activity 
caused the upward manipulation of copper futures prices on the COMEX.
74
  
Thus, distortion of prices can, under certain conditions, spread to other 
markets or to other exchanges, which should be considered in a 
comparative price analysis. 
2. Intent 
Although some scholars argue that the harms of manipulation are 
sufficiently indicative of such behavior that they warrant remedy even 
absent a demonstrated intention to manipulate,
75
 it is clear that 
manipulation liability is never incurred unintentionally.
76
  Importantly, 
manipulation does not occur by simply trading in a manner that affects the 
price.  The scienter requirement articulated in In re Indiana Farm Bureau 
makes clear that more is required:  “the intent requirement, which is the 
same for a manipulation and an attempted manipulation, is ‘the 
performance of an act or conduct which was intended to effect an artificial 
 
 71.  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 9. 
 72.  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 7-10. 
 73.  In re Sumitomo Corp., CFTC Docket No. 98-14 (CFTC May 11, 1998). 
 74.  Id. at *18. 
 75.  For examples of such arguments, see Pirrong, supra note 50; Fischel & Ross, supra 
note 28. 
 76.  See Markham, supra note 1, at 284 (observing that “the government and the courts 
have engrafted an intent requirement onto the prohibition against manipulation, requiring a 
showing that the trader intended to create an artificial price”). 
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price.’”
77
  That is, scienter in manipulation law is intent as to the artificial 
price element.  The Cargill court concluded that “[t]he aim must be . . . to 
discover whether conduct has been intentionally engaged in which has 
resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of supply and 
demand.”
78
 
A requirement of intention is important because it is widely believed 
that some arrangements with manipulative effects can occur by accident.  
For example, a market actor may buy a quantity of futures as well as the 
underlying commodity, and then the supply of the underlying commodity 
may decline for unrelated reasons.  She would find herself with a right to 
demand delivery from counterparties while, quite innocently, she owns 
much of the existing stock of the commodity.  The law regards this 
accidental corner quite differently from one that the trader intentionally 
effected.  In Great Western Food Distributors v. Brannan,
79
 which 
concerned manipulation of the market price of refrigerated eggs, the court 
declared that “the intent of the parties during their trading is a 
determinative element of a punishable corner” and unintentional corners 
should not carry the same penalties.
80
  Similarly, in Volkart Brothers v. 
Freeman, the Fifth Circuit, considering a squeeze in the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange, recognized that squeezes may be mere congestions and 
thus, it must be proven “that [the respondents] intentionally brought about 
the squeeze by planned action.”
81
  If intent were not required, many 
accidental transactions would be subject to liability.
82
 
Although specific intent is required under the CEA, courts have 
allowed proof by way of circumstantial evidence or by showing that the 
defendant had both the motive and the opportunity, as with securities fraud 
law.
83
  Objective econometric analysis therefore plays an important role in 
establishing subjective state of mind.  For example, the Cargill court, 
considering unusual trading patterns at the end of a trading day, found that 
Cargill’s “behavior in liquidating its contracts was clearly intentional and 
 
 77.  [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, 27,282 (CFTC 
Dec 17, 1982) (citation omitted). 
 78.  Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 79.  201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953). 
 80.  Id. at 479. 
 81.  Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 82.  See Markham, supra note 1, at 320 (“[T]he term manipulation means more than the 
charging of what someone may consider to be an unreasonably high price. . . .  A squeeze 
not planned or intentionally brought about by a trader would not be actionable under the 
Commodity Exchange Act.”). 
 83.  Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1167-70.  Such inference of intent is in agreement with 
Perdue’s definition of manipulation “as conduct that would be uneconomical or irrational, 
absent an effect on market price.”  Perdue, supra note 19, at 348. 
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was highly unusual market behavior; and the method of liquidating the 
unresolved open interest following the close of trading was also unusual 
and clearly controlled by Cargill.”
84
  Intent was the best explanation for 
unusual behavior. 
Courts will sometimes infer that actions taken contrary to apparent 
commercial interest are indicative of intention to manipulate.  The notion 
of commercial interest was also addressed in In re Sumitomo, where traders 
for Sumitomo “acquired and maintained a dominant and controlling 
position in both the physical supply of deliverable LME warehouse stocks 
and in maturing LME futures positions.”
85
  The CFTC inferred that “[t]hese 
positions were not intended to meet Sumitomo’s legitimate commercial 
needs,” but rather “[t]he intent motivating the acquisition and control of 
both the cash market positions and the futures market positions was 
expressly to create artificially high absolute prices and artificially high and 
distorted premium of nearby prices over futures prices.”
86
  Further, “[a]s 
the Commission has observed, when a price is affected by a factor which is 
not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily artificial.”
87
 
Circumstantial proof of intention may include profit motive;
88
 tying up 
delivery and/or transportation facilities;
89
 establishment of substantial 
futures and cash positions and subsequent disposition of those positions, 
particularly if not consonant with ordinary commercial behavior;
90
 use of 
step-up orders;
91
 and payment of prices in excess of fair market value.
92
  
This is typically combined with appropriate analysis to exclude legitimate 
reasons for such actions, which is both a key legal dimension of 
manipulation law and one in dire need of economic analysis to be properly 
conducted.  Finally, Russo observes that a long who takes advantage of a 
natural squeeze in supply “by standing for delivery can rightfully be said to 
have intended the natural and foreseeable consequences of his or her act.”
93
  
In such a case, a passive investor, upon learning of the squeezed market 
 
 84.  Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1170-71. 
 85.  In re Sumitomo Corp., CFTC Docket No. 98-14, at *17 (CFTC May 11, 1998). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at *18. 
 88.  Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971); In re Hohenberg Brothers, 
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20271, (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977); In 
re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). 
 89.  As alleged by plaintiffs in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 1980); 
RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-20. 
 90.  Cargill, 452 F.2d 1154. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  In re Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1232-39 (U.S.D.A. 1971); see also RUSSO, 
supra note 39, §12-20. 
 93.  RUSSO, supra note 39, §12-34. 
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conditions and deciding to act on this knowledge, becomes an active 
manipulator. 
D. Manipulation is Hard to Prove 
Over the last several decades, the CFTC has not successfully 
prosecuted a meaningful number of manipulation cases.
94
  Many agree that 
its lack of success in litigation has been due in great part to the fact that in 
order to establish manipulation, the CFTC was required to prove the intent 
to create an artificial price, that prices were in fact artificial, and that they 
were caused by the alleged manipulator.  As one scholar has noted: 
[U]nder present law the crime of manipulation is virtually 
unprosecutable, and remedies for those injured by price 
manipulation are difficult to obtain.  Moreover, even where a 
prosecution is successful, the investigation and effort necessary 
to bring a case will involve years of work, enormous 
expenditures, as well as an extended trial.
95
 
The difficulty of proving manipulation as a conceptual matter has been 
discussed above, but its practical difficulties are best illustrated by the 
financial market’s most shocking contemporary manipulation—Libor. 
1. Libor 
Libor has been called “the world’s most important number,”
96
 and it 
dominates the interest-rate swap market
97
and syndicated loan market,
98
 and 
 
 94.  Dissatisfaction with the CFTC has been noted by members of Congress and in case 
law.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Improvements Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 707, 102nd 
Cong. 212 (1991); 135 CONG. REC. H5603, H5613 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1989) (statement of 
Rep. Long) (“I feel that we should do all that we can to ensure that the CFTC play a more 
active role in regulating the exchanges . . . .”); Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade 
of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1166 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he amendment was motivated in large part 
by dissatisfaction with the Commission’s failure to take vigorous action in this very 
case. . . . A separate provision in both bills further reflects Congress’ view that the 
Commission’s supervision has been less than adequate.”). 
 95.  Markham, supra note 1, at 281; Pirrong, supra note 17, at 60 (“The reasoning in 
several cases makes it virtually impossible to meet any of these three standards, let alone all 
three simultaneously.”). 
 96.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
 97.  Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, A Comparison of Libor to Other 
Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickery/LiborKSV_staff_webpage.pdf. 
 98.  Xanthe Lok, Libor and Market Disruption: The Future of Libor, 23 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 421, 421 (2008). 
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powerfully influences residential and commercial mortgages.
99
  The British 
Banker’s Association (BBA)’s website states that Libor is the primary 
benchmark for short-term interest rates globally, and is used as the basis for 
settlement of interest rate contracts on many of the world’s major futures 
and options exchanges.  At least an estimated $350 trillion worth of 
contracts reference Libor.
100
 
Early in 2011, it became public that the U.S. Department of Justice, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CFTC, the Japanese 
FTC, the European Commission and other regulatory agencies
101
 had 
started investigating the possibility of a conspiracy between traders and 
treasury departments of several major banks aimed at manipulating Libor 
in various currency denominations between at least 2006 to at least 2008.  
In June of 2012, Barclays detailed how its traders had attempted to 
manipulate Libor since at least 2005,
102
 for which Barclays paid a 
settlement of $450 million—then the largest fine ever levied by the U.S. 
and U.K. regulators.
103
  In addition to these governmental investigations, 
there is significant private litigation activity currently in its initial stages. 
During the period of time corresponding to the allegations, Libor 
operated by way of sixteen banks submitting sealed daily quotes, and the 
“middle 8” quotes (in terms of value) being converted into the Libor 
through a simple arithmetic mean calculation.  The Libor quotes are 
submitted by an employee of each of the contributor banks, just before 11 
 
 99.  Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limbo: A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 365, 365 (2009) (stating that Libor is the reference rate for $900 billion in subprime 
mortgages); Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Laurence Norman & James Hagerty, LIBOR’s 
Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at B1. 
 100.  Kuo et al, supra note 97; The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com 
/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (“bbalibor . . . is written into standard derivative and loan 
documentation such as the ISDA terms, and is used for an increasing range of retail products 
such as mortgages and college loans. . . . It is the basis for settlement of interest rate 
contracts on many of the world’s major futures and options exchanges.”). 
 101.  See, e.g., Lindsay Fordado & Joshua Gallu, Libor Probe Said to Expose Collusion, 
Lack of Internal Controls, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2012-02-15/libor-investigation-said-to-expose-collusion-lack-of-internal-
controls.html. 
 102.  Non-Prosecution Agreement, Appendix A, Statement of Facts (June 26, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941.pdf. 
 103.  Lindsay Fortado & Silla Brush, Barclays Fined by U.K., U.S. for Falsifying Libor 
Rates, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-
27/barclays-said-to-be-nearing-libor-settlement-with-fsa-cftc.html.  Since that time, UBS 
paid about $1.5 billion, and Royal Bank of Scotland paid about $600 million.  Danielle 
Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 million to Resolve Libor Case, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rbs-to-pay-612m-to-
resolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html?wprss= 
rss_business.  
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a.m. each day, in response to the following question:  “At what rate could 
you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting 
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”
104
  The 
quotes are supposed to reflect the rate at which large banks can borrow 
unsecured funds from other banks.  On a daily basis, after all quotes are 
submitted and the Libor is computed, all of this information (including all 
individual quotes) is made public. 
The alleged manipulation concerns the submission of knowingly 
inaccurate Libor quotes by the panel banks.  If several banks submit figures 
that do not closely match their actual borrowing costs in the interbank 
market, then the aggregate Libor is probably affected. 
Three theories are often discussed with respect to the alleged motive 
of the banks in this matter.  The first is a reputational theory, according to 
which several of the panel banks artificially depressed the price of Libor by 
submitting falsely low quotes, in order to preserve their reputations during 
the early days of the financial crisis.  Submitting a quote to the BBA that 
showed a very high borrowing cost in the interbank market might indicate 
that the market is unsure of that bank’s creditworthiness, which could result 
in worsening financing prospects.  No bank wanted to be the next Lehman 
Brothers or Bear Stearns, so each had an incentive to lowball their Libor 
quote.  Libor itself would consequentially end up too low. 
The reputational theory seems to be the most well-known, having been 
the subject of the Wall Street Journal article that brought the possibility of a 
Libor disruption to public attention,
105
 but plaintiffs in the various lawsuits 
generally rely on a different theory.  They posit that the panel banks were 
motivated by a desire to extort wealth from their customers.  This 
extractive theory points to the fact that a disruption in the Libor would 
result in large wealth transfers, benefiting or harming anyone who had a 
non-zero net exposure to Libor.  If Libor were artificially lowered, those 
who owed money on loans written to Libor would owe less to their lenders 
than before.  Contracts that are settled in terms of Libor would be lower in 
value.  For example, the CME Eurodollar futures contract settlement price 
is defined as one hundred minus Libor,
106
 so that a four percentile drop in 
Libor would result in a four percentile drop in settlement value to the 
purchaser. 
The panel banks borrow or lend at Libor, and they may take positions 
in the Eurodollar contract market, but the most important means of 
 
 104.  The Basics, BBA LIBOR, supra note 100. 
 105.  Mollenkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7. 
 106.  Eurodollar Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-
rates/stir/eurodollar_contract_specifications.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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extraction would have been by way of interest rate swaps.  Interest rate 
swaps are a massive market approaching $450 trillion dollars in notional 
value,
107
 in which the fourteen largest dealers are a party to eighty-two 
percent of the transactions by value.  Libor panel banks are among the 
largest swap dealers in the world.
108
 
Interest rate swaps allow corporations, commercial banks, and other 
entities to manage their interest rate risk.  For example, the City of 
Baltimore has entered into many swaps in which it pays a fixed rate and 
receives Libor.  One 2003 swap has the city paying 4.97% to their 
counterparty and receiving the one-month Libor rate.
109
  This $17 million 
swap makes the city better off when interest rates rise, which is intended to 
help the city cope with its floating rate bonds, which become more 
expensive as interest rates rise. 
In a typical interest rate swap, one party pays a fixed amount and the 
other pays an amount linked to a varying rate such as Libor.  Generally, 
derivatives dealers will try to have something like a balanced position, 
offering a floating rate in one contract and receiving a floating rate in 
another.  That way they are not caught off-guard by the vagaries of interest 
rate changes.  Yet, by intentional trading or by accident, imbalances in 
position can occur.  And if a bank were to be a Libor payer more than a 
Libor receiver, it would benefit from Libor’s decline.  In the case of the 
City of Baltimore, a decline in the Libor rate would reduce Baltimore’s 
payment from its counterparty while its fixed-rate obligation remained 
constant.
110
  If Baltimore’s counterparty had no other Libor exposure, it 
would have accrued wealth from the manipulation.  The extraction theory, 
offered by the plaintiffs of In re Libor,
111
 as well as the economists Youle 
and Snider,
112
 holds that banks offered false Libor quotes in order to exploit 
the fact that they had robust net positions on Libor. 
A final theory is related to the extraction theory, but it does not 
 
 107.  ISDA Market Survey, ISDA.ORG (2009), http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-
Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf. 
 108.  Participants in the Mid-Year 2010 ISDA Market Survey, ISDA.ORG, 
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/Participants-MY10.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (listing 
the 71 banks that contribute to the ISDA survey). 
 109.  CITY OF BALTIMORE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT YEAR ENDED 
JUNE 30, 2009, at 58 (March 31, 2010). 
 110.  If Baltimore’s bonds are all linked to Libor as well, then the city may not net a loss 
or gain, but its bondholders would lose from a lower Libor.  
 111.  In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11-MD-2262, 2011 WL 
5980198 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011). 
 112.  Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs? 
(Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~youle001/ 
libor_4_01_10.pdf. 
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imagine long-term and large positions on a bank’s balance sheet.  Rather, 
the trading theory suggests that a bank may have engaged in trading that 
was informed by their knowledge of future Libor changes, or that they may 
have changed Libor to benefit short term trading positions.  This theory is 
closer to ordinary insider trading.  No vocal proponent has endorsed this 
view, though it does fit the tone of allegations against a recently dismissed 
trader from the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Singapore office.  Tan Chi Min 
alleges in his wrongful termination suit that it was common practice for 
senior bank employees to request that RBS seek to influence the Libor rate 
to profit their own positions as well as those of the banks.
113
  One could 
imagine traders treating Libor as their secret weapon to make sure that 
Eurodollar futures trades work out well more often than they should. 
This last example underscores an important point:  If any 
manipulation occurred, it may or may not have had institutional approval.  
Tan claims that it was RBS’s practice to influence the Libor, but his 
employer claims that Tan was fired for improperly influencing Libor on his 
own initiative.  On any theory, a manipulation might have been perpetrated 
by a rogue trader or executive rather than with the full approval of the 
board of directors. 
Nonetheless, even the lone wolf theory in which a trader acts alone 
calls into question a bank’s internal controls.  Regulators in Japan recently 
sanctioned Citigroup and UBS because their employees attempted to 
improperly, and repeatedly, influence the Tibor (the Tokyo equivalent of 
the Libor).
114
  The Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission said that the banks lacked internal controls to prevent rate 
manipulation.
115
  Barclays’ non-prosecution agreement included lurid 
descriptions of traders and rate-setters, sitting nearby one another or cozily 
agreeing to cooperate.
116
  The FSA’s subsequent investigation concluded 
that “[t]here are weaknesses in governance arrangements for the 
compilation process, and within contributing banks themselves.”
117
 
The result of potential manipulation could be monumental.  Consider 
 
 113.  2nd UPDATE: Ex-RBS Singapore Trader Sues Bank For Wrongful Dismissal, 
WSJ.COM (Jan. 12, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120112-
709529.html; see also Caroline Binham et al., Brokers Suspended in Libor Inquiry, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1. 
 114.  Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Calls for Action Against Citigroup and UBS, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 9, 2011, 7:29 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/japan-calls-
for-action-on-citigroup-and-ubs. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See supra note 102. 
 117.  THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 75 (HM Treasury, UK Sept. 28, 
2012); see also id. at 81 (explaining how Barclays failed to have adequate risk management 
or controls). 
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Libor’s impact on real estate.  One study by the Federal Reserve of 
Cleveland found that if the six-month Libor hovered 1.75% higher than 
historical averages would predict, as it did in early 2008, then the average 
subprime borrower would pay an additional $100 per month, per $100,000 
of remaining debt
118
  Thus, a modest manipulation upward in Libor could 
easily extract $1000-2000 per year from a typical subprime borrower.  
Regressive by any standard, this would increase mortgage defaults at a time 
when they already pose systemic risk concerns.  Individual wealth transfers 
can lead to inefficient capital allocation and systemic risks: 
A lower Libor induces a lower mortgage rate, makes it easier to 
buy homes, substituting homes away for other goods.  This 
artificially inflates the prices of homes . . . while deflating the 
prices of other goods.  The immediate implications of a non-
market determined Libor, over a prolonged period of time, have 
the potential to lead to bubbles and meltdowns of the type we are 
currently experiencing.
119
 
A manipulated Libor would affect wealth transfers and misallocate 
capital.  The index would also eventually lose respectability in the 
marketplace, which would be a tragedy.  The Association of Corporate 
Treasurers, once a critic of the banks alleged to have manipulated Libor,
120
 
recently issued a statement of appreciation for the Libor banks.
121
  Though 
potentially victims of any manipulation, corporate borrowers enjoy having 
a lingua franca for borrower rates, and would be genuinely harmed if Libor 
lost widespread credibility.
122
 
We discuss in a later section some of the means used to screen for 
potential manipulation and conspiracy in this market.  The immediately 
following section goes on to show the challenges that would be expected in 
bringing a suit against the panel banks under pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation 
law even if the allegations were true.  If the Libor disruption represented 
manipulation, the pre-Dodd-Frank CEA would be ill-equipped to remedy 
the manipulation. 
 
    118.   Mark Schweitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages and the Libor 
Surprise, tbl. 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentar 
y/2009/012109.pdf?WT.oss=libor&WT.oss_r=147. 
 119.  Rosa Abrantes-Metz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 
893, 897-99 (2011). 
 120.  Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, Loan Agreement Market Disruption 
Clauses to be Invoked only as a Last Resort (Sept. 28, 2008), 
http://www.treasurers.org/marketdisruption/pressrelease. 
 121.  Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, ACT Stresses the Importance of Libor 
and EURIBOR to companies, (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.treasurers.org/node/7329. 
 122.  Author’s conversation with John Grout, Policy & Technical Director, Association 
of Corporate Treasurers (Nov. 9, 2011). 
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1. Problems of Proof 
Before Dodd-Frank, manipulation law required proof of price 
artificiality and the defendant’s intention.  These are difficult elements to 
prove, and they are particularly difficult with a financial instrumentality 
like Libor.  Below, we apply these elements to Libor with a focus on the 
role of economic analysis. 
a) Artificiality 
Notwithstanding the longstanding use of empirical investigation in 
manipulation cases, described in I.C., supra, adjudicators have sometimes 
tied their hands by being hostile to econometric means of proving 
artificiality.
123
  Indiana Farm Bureau provides a particularly clear 
example.
124
  Although a 30% price jump on the last day of corn trading was 
enough to persuade two Commissioners of price manipulation, the majority 
dismissed the use of cash-futures price comparisons.
125
  The result has been 
a very high standard of proof with very little means of realistically attaining 
it.
126
  However, some scholars have concurred in skepticism about the 
possibility of inferring artificiality from a benchmark of comparable 
prices.
127
 
These problems become vastly more difficult when confronting 
interest rates rather than eggs.  If 30% price jumps in eggs are unimportant 
to a court, then some very profitable manipulations will fly below the 
court’s radar. 
One reason concerns scale.  For many commodity and swap 
transactions, the profits reaped from manipulation could be great even 
when the relative scale of manipulation is small.  The notional value 
indexed to Libor approaches $400 trillion.  A tiny change in Libor produces 
 
 123.  See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 50 (examining existing decisions which have 
restricted the use of econometric means in proving manipulation). 
 124.  In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). 
 125.  Id. ¶¶ 27,286-87; accord In re Cox, [1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 23,786 at 34,064 (CFTC July 15, 1987) (“[T]he prospective behavior of a ‘normal’ 
market is not necessarily bounded by the market’s historical experiences.”). 
 126.  See Pirrong, supra note 50, at 959 (explaining that “current precedents make it 
extremely difficult to find a trader guilty of manipulation even in cases in which the 
economic analysis suggests that the trader has indeed manipulated”). 
 127.  See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 1262 (“It seems fair to say that no two 
futures contracts behave identically, and even when similar futures exist, they may be 
occasioned by quite different market conditions or judgments.”); Lower, supra note 1, at 
394-96; McDermott, supra note 15; Perdue, supra note 19, at 373-80; Van Smith, supra 
note 25. 
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simply massive transfers of wealth.  For example, some have suggested that 
Libor was manipulated by about thirty basis points.
128
  If Libor were to 
move down thirty basis points, or 0.3%, Libor payers in aggregate would 
see their liabilities drop by more than $1 trillion per year.  If large banks 
were net payers on Libor, a great deal of this would inure to their benefit. 
If, for example, a bank were a payer of Libor on 10% of the world’s 
interest rate swaps by value, and a payee of Libor on 9% of the world’s 
interest rate swaps, their net exposure would be 1% of the world’s notional 
value, or $4 trillion.  Paying 0.3% less on that $4 trillion exposure would 
make the bank’s share of the misallocation exceed $10 billion annually, 
which is a very attractive return that could be caused by a relatively small 
manipulation.  These back-of-the-envelope estimates are within the 
ballpark of the banks’ own guesses.  Citi in 2009 reported that it would 
make $936 in net interest revenue if interest rates dropped twenty-five basis 
points per quarter for one year.
129
  These gradual changes are a fraction of 
the magnitude of the sudden price changes disregarded in Indiana Farm 
Bureau.  An extractive manipulation could be vastly profitable and yet 
within the realm of statistical error, and well below the threshold a court 
might demand. 
The relative profits could be even greater on a trading theory.  If a 
trader could consistently guess the tiny movements in Libor, or cause them 
in advance of a trade, then each trade could be marginally more profitable.  
With many trades per day, a bank’s proprietary trading desk could leverage 
an insight of three basis points into millions of dollars in a day.
130
 
Courts cannot assume that a manipulation large enough to tempt 
manipulators will also be large enough for demonstration in court.  Indeed, 
profitable manipulations may be so small that they are difficult to detect at 
all.  Once discovered, it may be hard to show that a small change in the 
price was not the result of chance or some other cause; therefore, 
materiality of the alleged behavior may be difficult to establish.  Unless 
reliable means can be used to find and locate the causes of true changes in 
the price of a swap or commodity, detection and proof will be rare and 
spotty. 
b) Intent is Hard to Prove 
For a plaintiff alleging manipulation, proving the defendants’ intent 
 
 128.  See Mollenkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7 (reporting that an analyst at Citi 
suggested that Libor was thirty basis points too low). 
 129.  Citi Form Y-9C. 
 130.  This activity could be aided by fast-trading hedge funds.  See Binham et al., supra 
note 113 (noting that hedge funds “place big bets on movements in [Libor] rates”). 
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entails clearing many hurdles.  Intent is a subjective state, which is not 
always readily demonstrable.  While courts accept circumstantial evidence 
of intent from behavior, that behavior is often explicable without any 
intent, bedeviling the demonstration of the requisite scienter.  If the 
investor has legitimate reasons for taking an action, then no manipulative 
intent can be concluded.
131
  As the judicial officer noted in In re Kosuga, 
“[d]rawing a line between legitimate trading and trading with manipulative 
intent is sometimes a very difficult task.”
132
  Since a small manipulation can 
still have a big impact, the trade or quote will not be far from what others 
would expect anyway. 
It is always difficult to litigate mental states, but the legal burdens of 
demonstrating intent are exacerbated by certain features of financial law 
and financial markets because these industries promote the evaporation of 
typical forms of evidence of scienter.  The Supreme Court has noted that 
“banking is a highly regulated industry,”
133
 and the more highly regulated 
an industry, and the more claims that are brought against participants in it, 
the likelier they are to avoid the sort of (electronic) paper trail to which 
plaintiffs have traditionally turned in seeking evidence of intent.  For 
example, financial professionals now know that when matters become 
sufficiently problematic, they should call one another—on their personal 
cell phones—making smoking gun e-mails increasingly rare. 
The In re Libor defendants may have left some documentary evidence 
if traders and brokers collaborated.
134
  The BBA excludes the top and 
bottom quartile of bank quotes, so that if any individual bank provides a 
“too low” or a “too high” Libor quote, it will be excluded by the 
determining group and hence will not directly influence the Libor.  Yet 
 
 131.  In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (“In the absence of evidence that 
respondents were responsible for the market congestion, it cannot be inferred that 
respondents’ trading activity, consistent with their hedging program and commercial 
commitments, was intended to produce an artificial price.  Standing for delivery as they did 
was respondents’ contractual right and was motivated by the pre-existing commercial needs 
and the uncertainty of price in the inactive cash market.  Unlike Cargill, Indiana Farm 
Bureau did not deplete the local cash commodity late in the delivery month; did not 
establish a large long speculative position at a time it knew it held virtually all of the cash 
commodity; and did not increase its long position on the last day of trading.  Nor did it 
liquidate a dominant speculative long position at prices already seven to eight cents over the 
market.”). 
 132.  19 Agric. Dec. 603, 615 (U.S.D.A. 1960). 
 133.  United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963). 
 134.  Affidavit of Brian Elliott in Support of an Ex Parte Application for Orders to 
Produce Records Pursuant to Section 11 of the Competition Act and for Sealing Orders, 
Canadian In re Libor investigation, at 11, (May 18, 2011) (“The Alleged Offences were 
carried out through e-mails and Bloomberg instant messages . . . .”). 
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manipulation remains possible.  Collusion, which might have left evidence 
of intent, would have made Libor manipulation far easier.  A collusive 
arrangement of at least five banks would certainly affect the Libor.  For 
example, if the five banks provide “too low” quotes, lower than all other 
banks, the bottom four will be excluded, but the fifth from the bottom will 
be included and will manipulate the Libor downwards.  If a manipulative 
cartel forms, as investigators become increasingly convinced occurred, it 
becomes likely that evidence of their coordination can be found to 
corroborate intent. 
Yet, the levels of collusion required to manipulate Libor are lower 
than it may seem.  Under some circumstances, a single individual can 
unilaterally affect the Libor rate.
135
  Although outlier quotes are excluded, a 
bank that moves the included middle of the pack closer to the outer quartile 
may affect the average, and any bank that arrives in the excluded outer 
quartile may push in another quote that would have previously been 
excluded; even banks excluded from the computation of Libor can affect it 
through false submissions, since it may cause other bank quotes which 
would not have belonged to the group of eight quotes entering in the Libor 
computation to be counted.  This is the indirect way in which even 
excluded banks may be able to affect Libor.
136
  Thus, all banks in the panel 
may unilaterally affect the average by moving the quote in at least one 
direction.
137
  Collusion would make the scheme much easier, but even small 
collusive arrangements could have a meaningful impact for the conspiring 
parties.  Perhaps this is why government investigators have focused on 
small conspiracies, often a request from a trader at a bank to a colleague 
working for a voice broker, rather than industry-wide cartels.
138
  When 
manipulation can occur by the cooperation of just a few individuals within 
 
 135.  Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and 
Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 101 (2013) (explaining how a single bank 
can manipulate the Libor rate). 
 136.  To make this clear, consider an example with four banks:  A, B, C, and D.  They 
submit quotes of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  At the start, A and D are the outlier quotes and 
excluded.  B and C are included and their average is 2½.  At this point, any bank but A can 
lower the quote.  If B submits ½ instead of 2, then B is excluded but A becomes included.  
The average of A and C is 2, which is lower than 2½.  If C submits ½, then the included set 
includes A and B, with average 1½.  If D submits ½ then the included set is A and B, with 
average 1½.  Only A cannot unilaterally lower the Libor rate.  See Rauterberg & Verstein, 
supra note 135, at 133-34 (analyzing manipulation mechanics) 
 137.  In fact, fewer than 50% of the bank quotes are excluded because banks with quotes 
that tie the middle 50% are included.  Thus, from January 2, 2007 until August 8, 2007, 95% 
of panel quotes were included in the average.  Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor 
Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136 (2012).  During that period, 95% of the time, a 
bank could influence the Libor total by changing its quote. 
 138.  See, e.g., Order for the Production of Records, Canadian In re Libor, June 9, 2011. 
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a bank, the challenge of proving intent through documentary evidence 
grows. 
The challenges in commodities partially parallel those under securities 
fraud law.  In securities litigation, a private plaintiff is required to show the 
defendant acted with scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”
139
  Not only is intent required to prove 
manipulation, but also the threshold for demonstrating intent, even at a 
motion to dismiss stage, is extremely demanding.  As the Supreme Court 
has put it, “[e]xacting pleading requirements are among the control 
measures Congress included in the PSLRA [Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act].  The [Act] requires plaintiffs to state with particularity . . . the 
facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention . . . .”
140
  This 
includes, under the PSLRA, that plaintiffs establish “with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”
141
  In Tellabs, the Supreme Court clarified what a strong 
inference is, stating that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of 
§ 21D(b)(2) . . . an inference of scienter must be more than merely 
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as 
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”
142
  The law thus 
establishes unusually challenging evidentiary burdens for the 
demonstration of intent in two primary contexts of financial manipulation: 
securities and commodities transactions. 
3. Problems of Scope 
Problems of proof are by now familiar.  Many profitable 
manipulations were hard to prove under the CEA, including—if it 
occurred—Libor manipulation.  More importantly, the CEA simply did not 
purport to cover many transactions that were of great importance.  For 
example, if Libor were manipulated, its greatest impact would be felt in the 
massive interest rate swap market.  Despite frequent efforts by the CFTC to 
assert jurisdiction,
143
 the Congress amended the CEA to be clear that it did 
 
 139.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (holding that an implied private cause 
of action exists under the Commodities Exchange Act). 
 140.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).  See 
generally Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (analyzing law governing 
intent in pre-Tellabs, but post-PSLRA era). 
 141.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
 142.  Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504-05. 
 143.  See Louis Vitale, Comment, Interest Rate Swaps Under the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 539, 541-43 (2001) (describing CFTC’s efforts to regulate 
interest rate swaps). 
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not cover Over-the-Counter (OTC) interest rate swaps between 
sophisticated parties.
144
  In the pre-Dodd-Frank days when much of the 
Libor manipulation is alleged to have taken place,
145
 Libor-related swaps 
would not have been eligible for redress under the CEA. 
CEA manipulation might still be alleged for exchange-traded 
derivatives, such as Eurodollar future contracts, but CEA manipulation law 
was unequipped to remedy such manipulation, even if it were adequately 
proved.  One reason is that the specific intent element is not simply an 
evidentiary problem of how to show that a defendant intended to create an 
artificial price.  It is a legal standard that actually excuses manipulations 
where the defendant recklessly created an artificial price while intentionally 
engaging in some other opprobrious conduct, but did not specifically intend 
to create the artificial price. 
Consider the reputation account of Libor manipulation, in which 
banks are alleged to have submitted false Libor quotes for no reason other 
than protecting their reputation.
146
  The quote submitter may not be 
attempting to injure any particular party.  She may not intend to affect the 
price of a commodity or security.  That is a byproduct, barely considered, 
of her desire to protect the bank’s reputation.  She may think that her quote 
will be an outlier from the pack and so excluded from the average and have 
negligible impact on the Libor rate.  Similarly, even if her quote is likely to 
influence Libor, and so the values of many assets and positions, including 
those of her firm, she may not have given any thought to the relationship 
between Libor and those other assets.  Her exclusive concern with firm 
reputation may be reckless, to be sure, but may lack specific intent to cause 
an artificial price for a swap or commodity. 
To go further, the quote submitter may not even know that the quote is 
false.  Libor is quoted in several currencies and tenors per day.  In addition 
to popular tenors like the U.S. Dollar (USD) three-month Libor, it also 
includes surveys of seven-month Swedish Krona borrowings.  Each day the 
bank is to provide its unsecured rate for borrowing Swedish Krona for 
seven months in London.  Yet the bank may not have borrowed any 
Swedish Krona in that duration in London that day,
147
 and the BBA rules 
 
 144.  Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 103, 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763A-377-78 (excluding contracts in excluded commodities between eligible 
contract participants); id. § 101 (adding interest rate to the definition of excluded 
commodity). 
 145.  Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 8. 
 146.  See, e.g., Robert Barr, Barclays CEO: Market Fixes Were for Protection, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 29, 2012, available at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/barclays-ceo-
market-fixes-were-protection (discussing the reputation theory). 
 147.  The Basics, BBA LIBOR, supra note 100 (“Bbalibor is not necessarily based on 
actual transactions, as not all banks will require funds in marketable size each day in each of 
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disallow the bank to simply take a USD rate and apply a foreign exchange 
conversion to it.
148
  The BBA asks for data the banks do not really have.  
The bank must devise some process to answer the question and that process 
may be good or bad, forthright or opportunistic, but intentionally false and 
manipulative would be harder to say.  This is not just a problem for obscure 
currencies. 
The most important Libor to swap and loan participants is 
undoubtedly the three-month Libor.  It is the basis of the majority of 
subprime mortgages, among other assets.
149
  Yet banks borrow very little at 
the three-month duration any more.  Seventy percent of interbank 
transactions are overnight, and ninety-five percent are for one month or 
less.
150
  Thus the world’s most important benchmark is set from some of the 
thinnest markets.  In the context of thin trading, it is harder for treasurers to 
report patently false quotes and easier for them to recklessly allow a quote 
that happens to be helpful to the bank.  The problems created by thin 
markets are not unique to particular currencies or tenors.  Suppose a bank 
gets a cheap loan from the government at a subsidized rate, or a loan from a 
creditor hoping to protect the borrower’s reputation.  Should the treasurer 
include this unusual loan in its assessment of the day’s borrowing costs?  
BBA can help to clarify these issues,
151
 but until it does, there is ambiguity 
about what counts as the bank’s borrowing cost.  A treasurer that interprets 
ambiguity in whichever way benefits her bank may be reckless with the 
truth, but it is hard to say that there is a specific intent to manipulate. 
Even if intentionally misleading quotes were offered with the 
knowledge that they could affect artificial commodity prices, it is not clear 
that they would fit under the CEA intention element.  The CEA does not 
require a profit motive for the manipulation.
152
  Nor need the manipulator 
 
the currencies/ maturities they quote and so it would not be feasible to create a full suite of 
LIBOR rates if this was a requirement.”). 
 148.  Definitions, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/definitions 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 149.  Guhan Venkatu, How Many U.S. Mortgages are Linked to Libor?, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF CLEVELAND (July 10, 2012), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0 
712/01banfin.cfm. 
   150.  EUR. CENT. BANK, EURO MONEY MARKET SURVEY (2007) (noting that seventy 
percent of transactions are overnight, and ninety-five percent are less than one month). 
 151.  McKenzie, supra note 7; see also author’s conversation with John Ewan, Director 
of BBA Libor (explaining that the unusual loan could be integrated into the submission). 
 152.  See CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“We do not 
agree . . . that a ‘profit motive’ or a ‘demonstrated capability of realizing manipulation’ are 
necessary elements of a manipulation or an attempted manipulation claim.”) (citation 
omitted).  Note that this would cover even pro-public interest manipulation.  Perhaps this is 
why Hazen includes government and regulatory actions in his chapter on manipulation.  
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 1292-93. 
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even hope to profit at her counterparty’s expense.
153
  But it is essential that 
the defendant have actually intended to manipulate the commodity, rather 
than trying to manipulate some other item while having reason to know that 
both prices would be affected.  For example, in one case from the Southern 
District of New York, a plaintiff alleged that manipulations of the Treasury 
notes market were affecting their positions in Treasury bill and Eurodollar 
future markets.  These markets are intimately related, and it might seem 
reasonable that if the defendant had intended to manipulate treasury notes, 
she might have intended also to manipulate Treasury bills and Eurodollar 
futures.  The court found that no claim was stated because Treasury notes 
were not underlying either Eurodollar futures markets or Treasury bill 
futures.
154
  It is not difficult to imagine a court finding that if a given bank 
intended to manipulate Libor, it did not necessarily intend to manipulate 
Eurodollar futures.  The specificity of intent can surprisingly narrow the 
scope of the CEA. 
II. MANIPULATION AFTER DODD-FRANK:  UNFINISHED 
In the aftermath of the largest global financial crisis since the Great 
Depression, and in the face of ongoing financial scandals discussed earlier 
in this Article, the CFTC adopted new anti-manipulation rules of potent 
generality and breadth.  In this Part, subpart (A), we overview the new 
statutory law and regulations and analyze their legal implications.  Subpart 
(B) shows that the new rules may be read as responsive to many of the 
concerns in Part I.  The standards of proof and scope have been adjusted to 
cover more potential manipulations, including the alleged Libor 
manipulation.  But that does not end the discussion.  Subpart (C) shows the 
changes to CEA manipulation law must be taken to precipitate a change in 
the technology used in consideration of manipulation.  Although it may 
seem that Dodd-Frank and its implementing regulations reduce the need for 
complex empirical analysis because it eases the challenge of showing 
specific intent and artificiality, in fact the legal system must become more 
attentive to econometric techniques than ever.  This is in part because of 
the factors that Dodd-Frank and the new rules do not address:  initial 
detection, establishing damages causation and recklessness, and pleading 
standards.  Each of these items remains the subject of intense empirical 
interest, to a degree only highlighted by the new rules.  Changing the 
 
 153.  See Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petrol., 666 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (stating that defendant oil company alleged to have suppressed the price of oil in 
order to qualify for favorable UK tax laws). 
 154.  Three Crown Ltd. P’ship v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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elements of the manipulation offense does not by itself end the difficult 
inquiries that frustrated manipulation before:  Complicated factual analyses 
will still be necessary to detect and plead manipulation, as well as to 
establish damages.  Without empirical support the law will either be 
toothless or else excessive.  Though the new rules address many of the 
difficulties with the CEA’s manipulation regime, the reforms are 
unfinished if they are implemented through rules alone.  They require 
thorough empirical analysis by courts and parties. 
A. Explication of Law 
The authority for the CFTC’s new anti-manipulation regulations is 
section 753 of Dodd-Frank, which amends section 6(c) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act.
155
  Three amendments and their implementing rules are 
consequential here.  First, section 6(c)(3) extends traditional market power 
manipulation prohibitions to cover swaps, and clarifies that intent will 
suffice where the manipulation was unsuccessful:  “It shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate 
the price of any swap, or of any commodity . . . .”
156
  Final Rule 180.2 
implements the provision:  “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap, 
or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or 
subject to the rules of any registered entity.”
157
  The Commission has 
expressed its intent to continue to be guided by the four-part test for price-
manipulation arising under the previous CEA section 6(c) and CEA section 
9(a)(2).  As previously explained, based on Russo and extensive case law, 
the four components are:  (1) the accused had the ability to influence 
market prices and (2) the intent to create or affect prices not reflecting 
legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) artificial prices existed and (4) 
the accused caused such artificial prices.
158
  For attempted manipulation 
cases, there are only two requisites:  the intent and an overt act in 
furtherance of that intent.  Thus, section 6(c)(3) modestly bolsters attempt 
liability and brings swaps into the market power manipulation regime. 
The other two amendments create, for the first time, a fraud-based 
manipulation scheme under the CEA, and in so doing import vast case law 
from the federal securities regime.  Section 6(c)(1) now declares that:  “It 
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, or 
 
 155.  7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15 (2012). 
 156.  Id. § 9(3). 
 157.  17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012) 
 158.  RUSSO, supra note 39, § 12.11. 
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attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale 
of any commodity . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance.”
159
  Section 6(c)(1)(A) extends the scope of section 6(c)’s 
primary prohibition, including within the reach of unlawful manipulation, 
delivering “a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning . . . market 
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any 
commodity . . . knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that 
such report is false, misleading or inaccurate.”
160
  In other words, it focuses 
on manipulation effected through false reporting. 
Rule 180.1 implements these amendments.
161
  It prohibits fraud and 
fraud-based manipulation as well as attempted fraud or manipulation by 
any person, acting intentionally or recklessly, directly or indirectly, in 
connection with any swap, cash, or futures contract.  Examples of conduct 
forbidden under rule 180.1 include: 
Us[ing] or employ[ing], or attempt[ing] to use or employ, any 
manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
Mak[ing], or attempt[ing] to make, any untrue or misleading 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or 
misleading; 
Engag[ing], or attempt[ing] to engage, in any act, practice, or 
course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person . . . 
[Knowingly or recklessly] deliver[ing] or caus[ing] to be 
delivered . . . by any means of communication . . . a false or 
misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market 
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of 
any commodity . . . .
162
 
This new rule differs from pre-Dodd-Frank rules in five important 
ways.  First, it extends to swaps.  Second, in contrast with pre-Dodd-Frank 
cases, in which the Commission had to establish that the fraud was in 
connection with a swap or cash or futures contract made, or to be made for, 
on behalf of, or with the victim of the fraud, rule 180.1 contains no similar 
limitation.  Third, while the new law allows trading on nonpublic market 
information obtained in the usual course of business, material nonpublic 
market information obtained through fraud or deception or in the breach of 
a pre-existing duty may not be used unless disclosed.  This brings an 
insider trading rule akin to the securities regime’s misappropriation theory 
 
 159.  Id. § 9(1). 
 160.  Id. § 9(1)(A). 
 161.  17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012). 
 162.  Id. 
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to commodities and swaps. 
Fourth, rule 180.1 relaxes two key elements of manipulation claims:  
artificiality and intention.  It expands the scienter standard to include 
reckless behavior, which may be sufficient by itself without the specific 
intent to defraud or manipulate. 
Finally, it is evident from the statutory language (and the language of 
the final regulations themselves), that the anti-manipulation rules import 
the language, and hence, presumably the case law of securities fraud under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) and SEC Rule 
10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
163
  The legal implications of the 
180.1 anti-manipulation rules are vast, and it is clear from the language and 
scope of the regulations that their drafters intended to have the kind of 
impact on the trading of commodities that Rule 10b-5 has had on the 
securities markets.
164
 
It may even go further:  Section 6(c) encompasses attempt, unlike 
section 10b of the SEA, and lacks Rule 10b-5’s requirement of a purchase 
or sale.  The implications of these rules are enormous, but our focus is on 
their interaction with cases of complex potential financial manipulation.  
Depending on the species of manipulation, sections 180.1(a)(1), (2), (4) 
and section 180.2 are all pertinent. 
B. Application to In re Libor 
The new provisions seem responsive to some of the challenges for 
pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation law, and so provide a means to address 
alleged Libor manipulation.  With rule 180.2, CFTC intends to extend its 
four-element price manipulation standard into this new rule, subjecting 
swaps for the first time to this liability scheme.
165
  Much of the Libor-
dependent market includes exchange-traded and OTC swaps.  The new 
rules clearly bring these into the fold. 
Rule 180.2 also covers attempted manipulations.  This may prove 
essential to covering cases where the manipulation was ineffective, and so 
did not create an artificial price.  For an example from the alleged Libor 
 
 163.  Comments of Daniel Arthur, Romkaew P. Broehm, & Gary Taylor regarding 
Proposed Rules 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 and 180.2, at 2, http://www.brattle.com/_documents/Uplo 
adLibrary/Upload905.pdf. 
 164.  See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,410 (July 14, 2011) (statement of Chairman 
Gary Gensler) (“This rule implements new Dodd-Frank authorities to police against fraud 
and fraud-based manipulative schemes, based upon similar authority that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Federal Trade 
Commission have for securities and certain energy commodities.”). 
 165.  Id. at 41,407-08. 
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manipulation, a bank that is already in the excluded quartile might submit a 
false quote that is even further into the excluded quartile in an attempt to 
influence the Libor rate.  This attempt would be unsuccessful since the rate 
would not change as a result of this quote.  However, the activity is the type 
of conduct that many would agree should be proscribed.  The attempt prong 
may be essential to prosecuting a panel bank whose quotes fall outside the 
mean-shaping quotes for the critical period and thus, arguably, is not part 
of the eight quotes that shape the mean and generate Libor’s value.  The 
rules also specifically contemplate attempt liability for an employee who 
orders a subordinate to make a fraudulent misstatement, but has that order 
rebuffed.
166
  They thus promote robust internal controls. 
The Commission’s authority is extended with respect to pre-Dodd 
Frank rules through its prohibition of manipulation and attempted 
manipulation that is either direct or indirect.  It expects to exercise its 
authority “where the fraud or manipulation has the potential to affect cash 
commodity futures, or swaps markets or participants in these markets.
”167
 
Rule 180.1 creates new types of manipulation liability with largely 
different standards.  The key inclusion of “recklessly” in the section 180.1 
definition of scienter is thought to substantially ease the specific intent 
requirement.  The Commission defines recklessness as “an act or omission 
that ‘departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very 
difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was 
doing.’”
168
 
This certainly eases the burden of proving manipulation.  Although 
intent can be proved by external evidence, it is a subjective state.  On the 
other hand, recklessness is fundamentally a standard of conduct that 
requires judgments about what information an actor should have had and 
what results she should have anticipated, regardless of whether she in fact 
acquired that information or intended any particular result. 
More interestingly, a recklessness standard seems to capture many of 
the hitherto elusive manipulations that might have occurred in the Libor 
disruption.  For example, the reputation theory has it that Libor is 
manipulated as an indirect result of the direct and specific desire to provide 
a submission quote that protects the banks’ reputation.  Artificial prices in 
loans, swaps, and Eurodollar futures are a more indirect result still.  It is not 
clear that a trader who did not think at all about those results would have 
had the specific intent requirement for CEA manipulation under the pre-
 
 166.  Id. at 41,403. 
 167.  Id. at 41,401 (emphasis added). 
 168.  Id. at 41,404 (quoting Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
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Dodd-Frank rules.  Now, it is clear that she would be eligible for reckless 
liability.  Even if she did not want or know about those other price effects, 
it is very difficult to believe that she was not aware of what she was doing, 
and of course she departed far from an ordinary standard of care. 
Recall also that many tenors of Libor are thinly traded and so provide 
the bank officer little evidence either way on what the appropriate Libor 
quote should be.  Here, it is hard to establish specific manipulative intent 
because the officer can hardly be said to have offered a quote that she 
knows to be false.  If there were no loans at all made at that tenor, and there 
have been none in a while, how can a particular number be assuredly 
incorrect?  Rather, she is simply being reckless by offering a quote that she 
has no good reason to think true, and it would seem to fall below a standard 
of ordinary care to give a quote that is not the fruit of a diligent 
information-gathering process.  Similarly, suppose a bank determined that 
it would use a different methodology every day to determine its Libor 
quote, selecting whichever yields the lowest quote.  It is unlikely that this 
calculation method amounts to a specific intentional manipulation as such, 
but it probably yields reckless quotes. 
The new rules also bring CEA enforcement to areas of overlap 
between the Commodities Exchange Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and 
Antitrust laws.  Many times, violations of the CEA are also violations of 
the SEA or of the Sherman Act.  For example, security-based swaps are 
under the jurisdiction of both the SEC and the CFTC.  Similarly, some 
manipulative or fraudulent schemes may cover a variety of security and 
commodity assets.  Some defendants may already be liable under the SEA.  
Yet allowing claims under the CEA that parallel the SEA is not mere 
superfluity because the CEA authorizes a wider range of defendants than 
does the SEA. 
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A.,
169
 the Supreme Court limited liability under section 10(b) of the SEA 
and rule 10b-5 to only “primary” perpetrators of fraud.
170
  The Court ruled 
that there is no private right of action against secondary actors such as 
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants who may have facilitated the 
fraud but did not personally make a false or misleading claim.
171
  
Subsequent decisions have only confirmed the SEA’s focus on primary 
actors.
172
  By contrast, the CEA explicitly grants a private right of action 
 
 169.  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 170.  Id. at 191. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 
(2008) (limiting “scheme” liability for secondary actors who have not made a false or 
misleading public statement or otherwise obtained a duty to disclose); see also James C. 
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against secondary actors.
173
  Thus, where an activity violates both the SEA 
and the CEA, such as a fraud that concerned both swaps and securities or of 
security-based-swaps where the CFTC and SEC have overlapping 
jurisdiction, secondary actors who are not liable under the SEA may still be 
subject to suit under the CEA.  The arrival of CEA manipulation to the 
realm of swaps and security-based swaps increases the degree of vicarious 
liability. 
With rules implementing Dodd-Frank’s anti-manipulation provisions, 
the U.S. is now a leader in both civil and criminal enforcement capacity for 
manipulation of financial indices and benchmarks, with regulators around 
the world taking the Libor disruption as an opportunity to decide whether 
they too should implement rules akin to Dodd-Frank’s.
174
 
C. The Dangers of Dodd-Frank: Market Manipulation and 
Intervention 
It may seem that these new regulations solve problems and reduce the 
need for expert economic analysis in adjudication.  Yet, they require 
empirical support to strengthen and temper their potential. 
The other side of powerful rules is the dangers of overdeterrence and 
mistargeted prosecution.  Rule 180.1 suits predicated on recklessness allow 
plaintiffs to avoid the marked difficulties of demonstrating intent or 
artificiality.  The downside of this elimination, however, is that 
recklessness opens the door to the prosecution of innocent (though 
complicated) economic behavior.  This is particularly important at the 
pleading stage, where it may appear that vastly more plaintiffs will be able 
to survive a motion for summary judgment even where their claims are 
baseless.  The new rules underline the importance of well-employed 
 
Dugan & Todd G. Cosenza, The Future of Secondary Actor Liability Under Rule 10(b)-5 
After Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 
793, 793 (2009) (“[I]t was widely believed that [Stoneridge] limited the ability of securities 
class action plaintiffs to bring claims against secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants, 
and investment bankers, who did not themselves make any false or misleading 
statements.”). 
 173.  7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person (other than a registered entity or registered 
futures association) who violates this chapter or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces, 
or procures the commission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual 
damages . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 174.  See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 117, at 11 (urging greater enforcement powers 
for FSA); Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Transcript 
of Oral Remarks Before European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 
Brussels Belgium (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@n 
ewsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opagensler-121.pdf (urging provisions similar to 
U.S. enforcement authority). 
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economic analyses as an essential boundary to the new rules.
175
  If 
economic tools can act as a buffer against the new rules, filtering out 
claims that implicate benign but complex swap transactions, it can lower 
the costs and reduce the fears of law-abiding swap market participants. 
III. PROPOSAL:  ECONOMETRIC SCREENS 
The new rules establish lower burdens in manipulation trials, while 
not altering the actual difficulty of detecting manipulation, the difficulties 
of proving causation and damages, or the importance of crafting an 
appropriate pleading standard.  This section describes some of the issues 
left unanswered by the new law, and alludes to the econometric 
technologies that are needed to supplement the new law.  It describes 
screening methodologies for detecting, proving, and dismissing alleged 
manipulation.  We describe examples of these three uses based on the 
professional experiences of one of the authors. 
A. Screens for Detection 
Regardless of how Dodd-Frank and its implemented rules adjusted the 
elements of manipulation, no claims will be brought if manipulation is not 
itself detected.  The art of flagging potential unlawful behavior through 
economic and statistical analyses is commonly known as screening.
176
  A 
screen is a statistical test based on an econometric model and a theory of 
the alleged illegal behavior, designed to identify whether manipulation, 
collusion, fraud or cheating of any kind may exist in a particular market.  
Screens use commonly available data such as prices, bids, quotes, spreads, 
 
 175.  See Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein In Credit 
Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 608-12 (2011) 
(questioning whether Dodd-Frank’s reforms went far enough in managing the risks 
associated with certain bespoke derivatives). 
 176.  For surveys of screening methodologies, their multiple applications, and how to 
properly develop and implement a screen, see Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Libor Litigation and the 
Role of Screening: The Need for Enhanced Compliance Programs, COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2011 [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz, Role of Screening]; Rosa 
Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, 
24 ANTITRUST 66 (2009) [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies]; 
Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple 
Applications Extended, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129 (2010) [hereinafter Abrantes-Metz 
& Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies Extended]; Joseph Harrington, Detecting Cartels, in 
HANDBOOK IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).  Additionally, in the 
context of detecting conspiracies, screens can be successfully used as detailed in A.B.A. 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, ch. 
VIII (2010). 
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market shares, or volumes to identify patterns that are anomalous or highly 
improbable. 
Broadly speaking, the literature identifies two primary screening 
strategies.  The first is to search for improbable events.  This type of screen 
is similar to looking for a “cheat” in a casino.  For example, the probability 
that a gambler at a Las Vegas casino will place a winning bet in roulette on 
black or red is 47.37%.  During a shift, a roulette dealer may see a handful 
of players win five, or even seven, times in a row.  However, the 
probability of winning twenty times in a row is around one in a million.  If 
a pit boss observes such an occurrence, he may not be able to prove that 
cheating has occurred, yet he would be well advised to watch the winner 
closely to avoid the risk of losing a significant amount of money.  One set 
of collusive screens generalizes this idea by searching for events that are, 
under normal conditions, improbable, unless agents in a market are 
cheating. 
The second type of screen uses a control group.  As an example, 
during the 1980s, one study found that the price of concrete was seventy 
percent higher in New York City than in other U.S. cities.  While it is true 
that the prices of many goods and services are somewhat higher in New 
York City, relatively few of those prices are seventy percent higher than in 
other large cities.  It was later established that an organized crime syndicate 
in New York City had been operating a concrete club that rigged bids on 
contracts over $2 million.  Prices that are anomalous, compared to other 
markets, suggest a lack of competition. 
This section continues by describing (1) the use of screens in 
government investigations, and (2) the use of screens in detecting 
anomalies in Libor data. 
1. Government Detection 
Antitrust law has long been receptive to economic analyses, both in 
terms of governmental regulation and judicial decision-making.  This 
section seeks to give a quick recapitulation of these features in order to 
illuminate how commodities manipulation could similarly benefit.  To 
begin with, seminal Supreme Court decisions have often cited economics 
literature as support for the directions that antitrust law takes.
177
  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has warned against not conferring evidentiary weight on 
 
 177.  See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
233 (1993) (citing economic analyses as support for claim that “[s]upracompetitive pricing 
entails a restriction in output”). 
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sound economic analyses.
178
 
Economic analysis and empirical screening have had great success in 
triggering antitrust cases, including actions against an Italian cartel in the 
baby milk industry and a Dutch cartel in the shrimp industry.  Screens have 
also been used successfully to identify potential anti-competitive behavior 
in gasoline markets by the Federal Trade Commission, and to prioritize 
complaints in the Brazilian gasoline retail market, leading to raids and the 
discovery of dispositive evidence.
179
  In Mexico, the competition authority 
has initially flagged a conspiracy in pharmaceutical markets through the 
use of bid-rigging screens, while in India screens were applied to detect a 
cement cartel.
180
  Competition authorities worldwide are using empirical 
screens to detect anti-competitive behavior, including the FTC, the 
European Commission, and competition authorities in The Netherlands, 
Austria, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Africa.
181
 
Two different examples can illustrate the power of screens to detect 
anti-competitive behavior in financial markets.  One is the recent stock 
options backdating and spring loading cases from the mid-2000’s and the 
other is the 1994 break of an alleged conspiracy by NASDAQ dealers in 
which odd-eighths quotes were avoided.
182
  Both of these were triggered by 
the application of screens to financial data and generated large size 
investigations as well as private litigation. 
 
 178.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962) (explaining that 
“[i]n such cases, it becomes necessary to undertake an examination of various economic and 
historical factors in order to determine whether the arrangement under review is of the type 
Congress sought to proscribe”). 
 179.  M.R. Venkatesh, Of Cement, Cartels and Corruption, REDIFF INDIA ABROAD (Jan. 
17, 2008), http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/jan/17cartel.htm. 
 180.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT IN MEXICO (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuseof 
dominanceandmonopolisation/49390114.pdf. 
 181.  Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, 
(A.B.A. Brown Bag Series “Beyond Leniency: Empirical Methods of Cartel Detection”), 
Dec. 15, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/2 
0111215_at1215_materials.authcheckdam.pdf; Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for 
Conspiracies Extended, supra note 176; Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 119.  It is also 
increasingly important and recognized to be important that derivatives regulators cooperate 
internationally.  See, e.g., Brooksley Born, International Regulatory Responses to 
Derivative Crises: The Role of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 21 NW. J. 
INT’L. L. & BUS. 607, 609-10 (2001) (“Recognizing that ‘derivatives markets serving United 
States industry are increasingly global in scope’ and that ‘events that disrupt financial 
markets and economies are often global in scope, require rapid regulatory response, and 
coordinated regulatory effort across international jurisdictions,’ Congress expressed its view 
that the CFTC should ‘continue to coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities, to 
participate in international regulatory organizations and forums . . . .’”). 
 182.  Rosa Abrantes-Metz, The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations, 7:10 SEC. 
LITIG. REP. 17 (2010). 
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The CFTC monitors trading and prices to screen for candidates that 
may warrant a closer look to detect potential illegal behavior.  The 
Commission’s monitoring and screening program uses several sources of 
market information.  Some data are publicly available, such as data on 
overall supply, demand, and marketing of the underlying commodity; also 
futures, options and cash prices, and trading volume.  Other information 
may be highly confidential, and that includes data from exchanges, 
intermediaries, and large traders.  As exchanges report daily positions and 
transactions of each clearing member to the Commission, those data may 
be analyzed as part of the screening effort.  The data separately show 
proprietary and customer accounts and the aggregate position and trading 
volume of each clearing member in each futures and option contract.  
These can be used to quickly identify the firms clearing the largest buy or 
sell volumes or holding the biggest positions in a particular market, though 
beneficial owners of the positions are not identifiable in these clearing data.  
As explained by the CFTC: 
[The] market surveillance program is intended to preserve the 
economic functions of U.S. futures and option markets under its 
jurisdiction by monitoring trading activity: 
 to detect and prevent manipulation or abusive practices, 
 to keep the Commission informed of significant market 
developments, 
 to enforce Commission and exchange speculative position 
limits, and 
 to ensure compliance with Commission reporting requirements. 
The market surveillance program’s primary mission is to identify 
situations that could pose a threat of manipulation and to initiate 
appropriate preventive actions.  Each day, for all active futures 
and option contract markets, the CFTC’s market surveillance 
staff monitors the daily activities of large traders, key price 
relationships, and relevant supply and demand factors in a 
continuous review for potential market problems.
183
 
Price aberrations in the cash market for an underlying financial 
instrument may provide an opportunity for an attempted manipulation.  
CFTC staff monitors cash prices of the financial instrument specified for 
delivery on the futures contract in relation to cash prices for non-
deliverable instruments that are close, or identical substitutes, noting that 
when deliverable prices are high relative to non-deliverable prices for 
 
 183.  CFTC Market Surveillance Program, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/CFTCMarketSurveilla 
nceProgram/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:57 PM 
402 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
financial instruments, it may flag the possibility to remove deliverable 
supplies from the futures market as part of an attempted manipulation.
184
  
Additionally, the Commission explains that another flag for manipulative 
activity is when market participants take positions well beyond their 
financial capacity to take delivery or make settlement.  The CFTC explains 
that it maintains open lines of communication with the Treasury 
Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the SEC and other 
agencies, since several financial products involve US Treasury or agency 
instruments (e.g., bonds or notes). 
With respect to cash-settled markets, the CFTC explains that its focus 
is on the integrity of the cash price series used to settle the futures contract.  
The size of a trader’s position at the expiration of a cash-settled futures 
contract cannot affect the price of that contract because the trader cannot 
demand or make delivery of the underlying commodity.  Since 
manipulation of the cash market can yield a profit in the futures contract, 
the CFTC monitors large reportable futures positions and is alert for 
unusual cash market activity on the part of large futures traders, which is 
particularly important during the time in which final cash price for futures 
settlement is determined. 
2. Non-Government Detection 
It is not only governments that can use screens to detect manipulation.  
This section describes a recent use of screens by one of co-authors of this 
piece and two other scholars (Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow 
(2008)), which flagged a possible conspiracy and manipulation of the U.S. 
Dollar London Interbank Offered Rate (“Libor”).
185
  The results of this 
study, and preliminary evidence previously put forward by the Wall Street 
Journal, warranted a closer look at the data.  Presently, government 
regulators,
186
 scholars,
187
 trade associations,
188
 and private litigants
189
 have 
 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 137. 
 186.  See, e.g., Joseph Palazzolo, Jean Eaglesham & Carrick Mollenkamp, U.S. Asks if 
Banks Colluded on Libor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2011, at C1 (stating that “U.S. investigators 
are examining whether some of the world’s biggest banks colluded to manipulate a key 
interest rate before and during the financial crisis, affecting trillions of dollars in loans and 
derivatives. . . .”); see also Donald Griffin, Citi Penalty Sought in Japanese Tibor Probe, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-
09/citigroup-penalty-sought-in-japanese-tibor-probe-nikkei-says.html (discussing Japanese 
regulators’ investigation of whether Citigroup pressured banks to submit interest rate quotes 
to manipulate the Japanese index interest rate in its favor); Brooke Masters, Patrick Jenkins 
& Justin Baer, Big Banks Investigated Over Libor, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011 (last updated 
Mar. 15, 2011, 10:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab563882-4f08-11e0-9c25-
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all developed a keen interest in understanding whether Libor acted 
atypically during the crisis, and whether, if it did, this was the result of 
human manipulation.  Initial interest in the potential manipulation of Libor 
is the result of screen application.  Not only did this screen help to raise 
initial concerns as to Libor disruption; it also directed subsequent inquiries 
as to which periods of time most warrant additional scrutiny. 
The design of the study was as follows:  Abrantes-Metz and 
colleagues compared the one month Libor and the four month Libor—the 
rate at which large London banks purport to be able to borrow on an 
unsecured basis for one and three months at a time—to  the Federal Funds 
Effective rates.  The authors present the results for the one-month Libor 
and explain that they are qualitatively identical for the three-month Libor.  
These rates should not be identical.  The Federal Funds Effective rate 
represents overnight loans from one depository institution to another.  
However, given the short-term, unsecured nature of the loans, it would be 
intuitive for them to exhibit some relationship.  Similarly, when Abrantes-
Metz and her colleages compare Libor to the one-month Treasury rate, it 
would be unsurprising if some historic relationship existed.  Libor may be a 
higher rate than the Treasury rate because it exposes lenders to the risk of a 
bank’s default rather than that of the United States itself, presumably a 
higher risk,
190
 but both include the cost of borrowing money.  For them to 
wildly diverge for no reason would be cause for some subsequent inquiry. 
Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues determined the typical spread 
between Libor and these other rates going back to 1990 and then compared 
it to the spreads during recent months.  The Figure below, extracted from 
Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow (2008), represents the one month 
U.S. dollar Libor from January 2007 through May 2008, plotted against 
two comparable rates, the Federal Funds Effective rate and the one month 
Treasury-bill. 
 
00144feab49a.html#axzz2JVE4kS00. 
 187.  Snider & Youle, supra note 112; Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank 
Rate Fixings During the Recent Turmoil, BIS Q. Rev., March 2008, at 59; Connan Snider & 
Thomas Youle, Diagnosing the LIBOR: Strategic Manipulation and Member Portfolio 
Positions (Working Paper 2009), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~bajari/undergrad 
iosp10/LiborManipulation.pdf. 
 188.  Press Release, Ass’n of Corp. Treasurers, supra note 120.  But see ACT Stresses 
the Importance of LIBOR and EURIBOR to Companies, ASS’N OF CORP. TREASURERS, 
http://www.treasurers.org/node/7329 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (showing appreciation for 
LIBOR and EURIBOR). 
 189.  See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 135, at *58 (analyzing litigation claims). 
 190.  But see, e.g., Richard Wolff, Q&A: What If U.S. Defaults on Debt?, 
USATODAY.COM (last updated July 15, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/2011-07-14-what-deficit-fight-means_n.htm (addressing the possibility of 
the United States defaulting on its debt in the wake of the 2011 debt ceiling crisis). 
VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:57 PM 
404 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 (Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow (2008 & 2012)) 
Several interesting observations can be made from this graph and the 
associated data.  First, the Libor rate seems to move through distinct phases 
between the start of 2007 and the middle of 2008.  Superficially, the Libor 
rate appears to be essentially constant for the first 8 months of 2007 before 
it begins to fluctuate rapidly.  Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues find the 
Libor quotes during that period suspicious.  They also confirmed a 
suspicious breakdown between banks’ individual Libor quotes and their 
own CDS spreads.  Banks that reported lower borrowing costs than their 
peers in terms of their Libor (implying relative stability) were often more 
expensive to insure in the CDS market (implying a lack of stability).
191
  
Other empirical studies followed by Snider and Youle
192
 and Abrantes-
Metz and her colleagues.
193
  These studies employ additional screens to flag 
certain anomalous patterns in the Libor data. 
 
 191.  Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136, 
147 (2012). 
 192.  Snider & Youle, supra note 187; Snider & Youle, supra note 112. 
 193.  Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 119.  In many data sets, the distribution of digits 
has a natural, regularly occurring pattern.  Benford’s Law is a mathematical formula that 
describes this distribution.  Studies have shown that the law applies to a surprisingly large 
number of data sets, and violations can raise questions as to whether the data have been 
manipulated or artificially generated.  Benford’s Law is commonly applied in accounting 
applications to screen for manipulated or falsified financial statements. 
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While the research studies cited above generally acknowledge 
anomalies in the Libor quote data, they are merely suggestive of 
wrongdoing.  In fact, the 2008 study by Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues 
specifically benchmarks the Libor against other contemporaneous short-
term, risk-free rates in periods not suspected of manipulation, applies those 
benchmarks to the suspect periods, and finds that the average level of the 
Libor does not deviate in a statistically significantly manner from these 
benchmarks.  Yet screens like this have helped trigger investigations that 
will look for other evidence for or against the suspicious behavior.  
Ultimately, very profitable manipulations could have happened within the 
margin of error, making even low certainty results warrant further 
investigation.  The Libor litigation will provide a fruitful example of the 
multiple uses of screens, and it has already shown how powerful these can 
be in identifying situations warranting a closer look. 
While the CFTC maintains extensive monitoring systems, journalists 
and economists flagged the Libor disruption.  There is no reason for 
screening tools to be isolated to the government, and Libor shows the great 
fruits of non-governmental screen use.  There are many uses of screens for 
market participants.  It is critical for market players to know and anticipate 
how they may be screened.  For potential plaintiffs, screening techniques 
may help them to note potential manipulation at all, the first step in 
redressing it.  Potential defendants would do well to establish screening 
within their governance and compliance programs.  Insofar as firms do not 
wish to be the targets of investigations and lawsuits, they will attempt to 
prevent their own staff from engaging in manipulative actions that can be 
imputed to the firm.  Screens can be a crucial tool in helping firms locate 
and stop problems within their own house, rather than in a court later.  It is 
far better to hear about and remedy manipulation detected through an in-
house screen than after a conversation with regulators. 
Any of the individual banks providing Libor quotes could have (and 
some of them might have) used such methods themselves to identify the 
same anomalies in real time.  An internal audit or compliance function, by 
anticipating these regulatory investigations, could have protected the banks 
against allegations of malfeasance, or at least could have been an important 
factor in convincing authorities that significant efforts had been made by 
the company to detect any possible wrongdoing, if any did exist.  They 
could also have been used by the agencies themselves to flag the possibility 
of wrongdoing. 
B. Screens in Proof 
Although recklessness will now suffice rather than intentional 
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artificiality, econometric proof has not been reduced in importance for 
adjudication.  Artificiality may not be an element in 180.1 actions, but scale 
of price distortion may be an important factor in computing damages, as 
will causation.
194
  Screens can be a useful tool in establishing damages and 
causation, and as well as pressing a 180.2 claim with respect to swaps.  For 
obvious reasons, any empirical approach to present or defend allegations of 
fraud and manipulation relies not only on the actual facts of the case, but 
also on the type of direct evidence available.  For example, a 180.1 action 
could be brought in part based on emails between traders that seem to 
indicate the use of a fraudulent device.  But trader-speak can often be 
ambiguous, and supporting economic evidence may help prove or disprove 
that their communications indicated fraud. 
Economic analyses in general, and screens and other types of 
empirical approaches in particular, can play critical roles in these 
circumstances.  Scholars have been calling for increased attention to 
economic analyses for some time.
195
  The success of screens in focusing 
attention on Libor and the new CFTC rules simply offer the most 
opportune moment yet for commodities manipulation law to move forward. 
The role of economic analysis and the economic expert can be very 
important in inferring intent under these circumstances by performing a 
variety of studies on what is “usual” market and trading behavior and what 
may be considered “unusual” and potentially indicative of manipulation. 
This section presents possible empirical analyses for hypothetical 
situations that may be undertaken for particular types of cases. 
1. Possible Empirical Analyses for a Hypothetical Case Brought 
Under Rule 180.1 
Imagine that the CFTC has brought allegations of conspiracy and 
manipulation against traders in a financial services firm called Gospis and 
brokers in a brokerage firm called Brokatus.  Specifically, the CFTC 
alleges that some brokers from Brokatus conspired to obtain new business 
and increase existing business in swaps as well as in cash and futures 
transactions from Gospis’ traders.  This group of brokers (call it “allegedly 
tainted brokers”) provided a variety of gifts to the aforementioned group of 
traders (call it “allegedly tainted traders”), a practice that was not allowed 
 
 194.  Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(10)(C)(ii) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 
9(10)(c)(ii)) (allowing treble damages). 
 195.  See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 17, at 63 (prescribing that “the amended law should 
explicitly prescribe, endorse, or recommend the use of statistical and econometric methods 
to establish the existence of specific anomalous price and quantity relations” in order to 
enhance the efficiency of U.S. future market anti-manipulation regulation). 
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by either Brokatus or Gospis.  The CFTC also put forward the theory that 
the allegedly tainted brokers were of lower quality when compared to the 
other brokers at Brokatus, which was the reason why they had to bribe 
traders at Gospis. 
An economic expert employed by one of the parties will undertake a 
variety of analyses to determine whether there is any empirical support for 
these allegations.  There are fundamentally two inquiries to pursue.  First, 
was there a causal relationship between gifts and trade execution quality.  
Second, was there an incentive for the tainted traders to actually select their 
brokers based primarily on the gifts received. 
On the first point of execution quality, one approach is to compare the 
quality of execution of the pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers 
during the allegation period against appropriately untainted benchmarks.  
The quality of execution could be measured by the amount by which those 
trades beat average market prices, thus producing benefits for Gospis.  If 
gifts were the reason why the tainted traders chose to place their trades with 
the tainted brokers, then we should expect to observe a lower quality of 
execution between these pairs and any other untainted pairs.  There are 
several untainted benchmarks to be considered:  (i) the same pairs of 
allegedly tainted traders and brokers before the allegation period; (ii) the 
same allegedly tainted traders when placing their trades with untainted 
brokers during the allegation period; (iii) untainted traders when placing 
the orders with allegedly tainted brokers during the allegation period; and 
(iv) untainted traders when placing their trades with untainted brokers. 
The economic expert will search for lower execution quality for the 
pairs of allegedly tainted traders with allegedly tainted brokers during the 
allegation period, when compared to any of the four benchmarks above.  
Changes in the relationships between allegedly tainted traders with 
allegedly tainted brokers from before the allegation period to during the 
allegation period would also be considered, and compared to changes 
during the same periods of time between any of the benchmark groups. 
Just as important as the choice of the benchmarks is the specification 
of the model explaining quality of execution.  It is important to frame the 
analysis in the context of a multiple regression model so that a variety of 
potentially relevant factors can be taken into consideration, and a measure 
of materiality can be scientifically obtained through statistical significance.  
Such factors to take into account are:  the characteristics of the contracts 
and swaps involved; the trading conditions on a daily basis (for example, if 
there was any relevant news on those days); the time of the transaction 
(was it in the last few minutes before floor trading closed for the day), or 
time to floor trading close; market depth; market liquidity; floor versus 
electronic trading; market volume for the day and during the last few 
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minutes of floor trading when applicable; relative size of the trade in terms 
of volume for the relevant time period; number of transactions in the last 
few minutes; times when brokers received traders’ orders and execution 
times of those trades; relevant sectors; specific transaction orders (as for 
example, if the broker can break a large trade into several blocks or not) 
and order types; portfolio manager instructions; multi-broker placements; 
relevant price average values and volatility; recent relevant prices trends; 
basis value when applicable (measured as the futures minus the spot/cash 
price); residual interfund trades; number of other trades placed in the same 
few minutes interval; day of the week; and potentially other factors. 
With the results of these models, a variety of tests can be run in order 
to establish any material differences in execution quality for the pairs of 
allegedly tainted traders and brokers during the allegation period, when 
compared to benchmarks. 
Are the qualities of execution from the allegedly tainted pairs 
statistically different from, in particular lower than, the qualities of 
execution for any of the other benchmark pairs? 
After taking into account all of the factors that may explain quality of 
execution as outlined above, let’s consider the regression errors as 
containing all other explanations for execution quality that were not 
directly controlled for in our model.  Do these regression errors differ in 
terms of variances, and overall distributions, between the allegedly tainted 
pairs and any of the benchmarks? 
Does the execution quality of allegedly tainted pairs present the same 
variability over time as those from benchmarks? 
How do the trades from these pairs of allegedly tainted traders and 
brokers compare to the overall universe of trades between all traders and all 
brokers?  Do they tend to be on the lower end of the distribution? 
Are there either a larger number of negative qualities of execution for 
the allegedly tainted trader and broker pairs, or more significant negative 
values, when compared to the benchmarks? 
Suppose there are 30 such pairs of allegedly tainted traders and 
brokers, and that there is a universe of 450 pairs of traders and brokers that 
are untainted (benchmarks (i)-(iv)).  If we draw 10 random samples of 
qualities of execution from the 450 untainted pairs of size 30 pairs each, 
how do these compare to the qualities of execution of the 30 allegedly 
tainted pairs?  Can we distinguish the 30 allegedly tainted pairs against any 
of the other random samples of the same size, in terms of any of the 
relevant features of the quality of execution? 
The same analyses that are carried out for the group of tainted traders 
and brokers over time would also be undertaken at a more micro level, such 
as the ones outlined below. 
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On a daily basis, how does the intraday variability of the qualities of 
execution for the allegedly tainted traders and brokers compare to the 
intraday volatility for the remaining benchmarks? 
Are there a larger proportion of negative qualities of execution for the 
allegedly tainted pairs than for the benchmarks on a daily basis?  Are the 
negative values for the qualities of execution of the allegedly tainted pairs 
larger in terms of magnitude than those of the untainted pairs, again on a 
daily basis? 
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs during the allegation 
period, can we identify any particular pairs which seem more suspicious in 
terms of the characteristics of the quality of execution, meaning that 
performed worse in terms of quality of execution? 
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs, what was the proportion 
that performed better than the average of all trades, the same, and worse 
than the average of all trades?  How do these proportions compare to the 
same proportions across all of the untainted pairs?  And how do these 
proportions compare with respect to those in 10 random samples of size 30 
untainted pairs each? 
Of course, other more specific analyses may also be undertaken by 
defendants’ economic expert and the CFTC, but for the most part, their 
core would be similar to those outlined above. 
With respect to the second point on the incentive of traders to select 
brokers based primarily on gifts received, these traders had strong financial 
incentives to perform well.  Traders had the incentive to choose the “right” 
brokers so that their compensation could be maximized.  Traders’ 
compensation was based on their financial performance, which is a 
function of a volume-weighted price metric for all of their transactions, and 
also of the classification of the traders’ work by their respective portfolio 
managers. 
Hence, a starting analysis on the incentive question would compare 
the quarterly compensations for the allegedly tainted pairs of traders and 
brokers against the compensations of the same benchmarks in (i)-(iv) 
factoring in other relevant and determining factors.  The analysis would 
pose similar questions about the compensations of these allegedly tainted 
pairs as those in (1) through (9) above.  Of course, this analysis is quarterly 
rather than daily, and other important factors may also have to be 
controlled for when conducting an appropriate compensation analysis such 
as tenure as a trader and the percentage of trades in swaps, cash and 
futures, among others.  Additionally, empirical analyses addressing the 
timing of transactions between allegedly tainted pairs and the reception of 
gifts would possibly also be undertaken. 
Additional analysis related to allegations of a conspiracy would also 
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have to be presented.  Screens could be applied to identify clusters of 
brokers that seem to differentiate themselves from all other brokers with 
respect to characteristics relevant for the alleged conspiracy.
196
 
2. Possible Empirical Analyses for a Hypothetical Case Brought 
Under Rule 180.2 
In allegations of actual manipulation, we may expect the CFTC to 
continue following the four tests addressing the following questions:  (1) 
did the accused have the ability to influence market prices; (2) was there an 
intent to create or affect prices not reflecting legitimate forces of supply 
and demand; (3) did artificial prices exist; and (4) did the accused cause 
such artificial prices. 
An economic expert on an alleged manipulation case will often start 
by considering two main lines of inquiry.  First, she will assess whether the 
defendant had the capability of affecting prices, and secondly, whether an 
artificial price was generated as a consequence of the alleged conduct.  
Depending on the specifics of the case, the incentive test may come in 
sooner or later in the analysis by the economic expert. 
As an example, let’s suppose the following allegations of direct and 
indirect manipulation of NYMEX settlement prices.  The CFTC alleges 
that a particular individual, “the defendant,” has manipulated downwards 
the NYMEX settlement prices for commodity A on specific days during the 
period of 2002 through the end of 2004, and as a consequence it indirectly 
manipulated downwards the NYMEX settlement prices for closely related 
commodity B.  Allegedly, the defendant was selling large quantities of this 
commodity on or about the last minute of floor trading, offering to sell at 
prices noticeably lower than those seen in the market at that moment in 
time.  Allegedly, the defendant entered the market in days specifically 
relevant for his trading in other commodities.  Namely, the defendant had a 
large amount of contracts for commodity B, which is closely related to 
commodity A.  In particular, the defendant had entered into contracts to 
purchase large volumes of commodity B, whose price has a high and 
positive correlation with the price of commodity A.  According to the 
CFTC, since the defendant’s positions were significantly larger in the 
market for commodity B than in the market for commodity A, what the 
defendant lost in terms of selling A at “too low prices” he more than offset 
 
 196.  For an explanation of a variety of screens that can be used when studying alleged 
conspiracies, see Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies, supra note 176; 
Abrantes-Metz & Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies Extended, supra note 176; A.B.A., 
PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER ANTITRUST FEDERAL LAWS, ch. VIII (2010). 
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in profit by buying B at “too low prices.” 
We will start by focusing first on the question of whether the 
defendant had the capability to affect market prices.  The economist must 
first define the relevant market.  Should the relevant market be essentially 
restricted to commodities A and B transacted on the floor of the NYMEX, 
or should it also incorporate electronic transactions on these commodities?  
Should transactions on these commodities performed at the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) be included?  Should other closely related commodities 
also be included in the relevant market? 
Secondly, the economist must determine how large are the trades 
placed by the defendant compared to the overall market volume to establish 
whether the defendant had the capability to manipulate prices.  
Determinations will have to be made as to the relevant time period of 
trading and on the location and type of trading as well.  In our case, the 
allegations are that the defendant manipulated NYMEX settlement prices 
for commodities A and B by trading large quantities in the floor in the last 
few minutes of floor trading.  Clearly, the economist needs to focus on the 
NYMEX settlement prices and on the volume during the last few minutes 
of trading, though the overall daily volume may also be relevant.  
Additionally, both floor and electronic trading during the last minutes of 
floor trading are part of the calculations of the NYMEX settlement prices 
for both commodities; therefore both of these should be taken into account 
when estimating the defendant’s relative market size.  Often, individual 
floor trade volumes are not publicly available, but sometimes it is possible 
for the economist to provide an estimate of these in order to infer the 
relative size of each trade. 
Once the above determinations are made, the economist will then be 
able to start analyzing whether prices on those markets were artificial 
during the days in which manipulation allegedly occurred, and in case such 
price artificiality is found, whether the defendant’s actions were the cause.  
Let’s suppose that in this hypothetical the relevant market is defined by the 
two commodities, and the transactions involved are those placed on the 
floor of the NYMEX and electronically.  Some of the approaches that may 
be relevant in this context are described below. 
One natural approach is to use a market model to “screen” the markets 
for price artificiality.  The question is, “had the CFTC built such a screen to 
flag unexpected patterns in these NYMEX settlement prices, would it have 
flagged the days in which the defendant sold commodity A as days in 
which the NYMEX settlement price was unexpectedly low?” 
Let’s focus on commodity A, as the analysis for commodity B is 
similar in nature.  The economist may construct a market model that 
explains variation in the daily changes in NYMEX settlement prices for 
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commodity A based on various exogenous variables that are not affected by 
the defendant’s trading in this market.  A market model incorporates 
returns (or changes) in an overall market index to track the performance of 
the entire economy, a commodity-specific index such as a spot index, and 
perhaps other factors such as ETFs.  These models typically have a high 
explanatory power for changes in the dependent variable, NYMEX 
settlement prices changes in this case. 
The next step is to analyze the excess returns for the NYMEX 
settlement prices, i.e., the part of the change in the NYMEX settlement 
prices which cannot be explained by legitimate changes in the variables 
used in the model, and to correlate these with the defendant’s trading 
activity.  Is there a statistically significant correlation between negative and 
statistically significant excess returns for the NYMEX settlement prices for 
commodity A and the days that the defendant was in the market selling 
these futures contracts at allegedly “too low” prices? 
Now, an absence of correlation may be compelling evidence of an 
absence of causation.  But the reverse is far more tenuous:  there can be a 
number of reasons why two things may be correlated without assuming that 
one causes the other.  One of the most likely is that we have omitted a 
relevant factor from our market model that drives both the NYMEX 
settlement price and the defendant’s decision to sell that commodity on the 
same day, generating a positive correlation between the two.  Such a factor 
could be a particular piece of news on that commodity on that day, or 
simply the fact that the market volume has attained a high or a low, or even 
news related to monetary policy, for example.  Hence, causality needs to be 
appropriately addressed in the context of an event study, in which relevant 
news are researched and timed to changes in relevant prices so that the 
cause of the price change can be identified, and intraday analyses may well 
be required. 
Another possible analysis based on the screening model is to look into 
the transitions from selling and not selling the commodity.  Divide the 
space of actions into in-in, in-out, out-out, out-in:  (i) “in-in” are days in 
which the defendant was in the market selling the commodity and 
continued in the market the following day; (ii) “out-in” represent moving 
from a day in which he did not sell the commodity to a day in which he did, 
and comparable definitions for out-out and in-out.  The economic expert 
may test whether there are sudden price jumps downwards on out-in days, 
and sudden price jumps upwards on in-out days, which would be consistent 
with the allegations of manipulation downwards of commodity A.  A 
variety of other tests could also be performed in this framework. 
Other, more common tests of price artificiality include the analysis of 
the basis for the relevant contracts, defined as the difference between the 
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futures price today for the relevant contract minus the spot or cash price 
today for the same commodity.  Comparisons can be made between the 
basis during days in which the defendant sold commodity A against those 
days in which he did not, or between prior and post alleged manipulation 
periods, or against the basis of other untainted contracts.  Is the basis for 
the allegedly manipulated contracts negative (i.e., does backwardation 
exist), or more negative on days in which the defendant sold futures 
contracts for commodity A at allegedly “too low” prices?  Movements in 
the basis may also have to be controlled for in terms of other relevant 
market variables. 
Yet another set of analyses that an economist will need to undertake 
are those related to the intent to manipulate, as discussed in section 2.  
Despite the difficulty in analyzing intent, an economic expert may have 
several potentially relevant analyses to pursue. 
Analyses related to liquidity, market depth and price discovery, 
described above in the context of price artificiality, may all also play an 
important role when addressing intent.  If the defendant intends to affect 
prices, it is easier to do so when trading during times of the day in which 
liquidity is low, which corresponds to times when the market does not have 
much depth, or on particular days in which that is more the case than 
others.  Additionally, he may more easily affect prices if he tries to affect 
the market in which price discovery takes place. 
Analyses of trading patterns may be critical when addressing intent.  
They do not require a price effect, but simply flag trading patterns 
consistent with a higher likelihood of intent to affect prices as being 
“unusual” in some sense for these markets.  One such approach is to 
empirically study the reasons why the defendant decided to trade in the 
specified markets on the particular days that he did, using factors that can 
be measured.  Was his decision to trade based on relevant exogenous 
events?  Does he typically trade on days in which volume is high, or days 
in which particular macroeconomic news occur?  Decision-making models 
may be developed and estimated to determine the factors more highly 
correlated with the defendant’s trading patterns to see if these, rather than 
an intent to affect price, can explain his trading pattern. 
An economic expert will likely also want to study profitability from 
the alleged conduct.  She will compute actual profitability from this 
strategy and compare it against defendant’s profitability in other moments 
in time.  She may also study whether the alleged misconduct is timed to the 
defendant’s quarterly assessments on which his compensation will be 
determined.  Additionally, she may estimate shadow strategies that the 
defendant would likely have undertaken had he not traded in the 
commodities markets allegedly manipulated, to estimate what would but-
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for profits have been under such shadow trading patterns and compare them 
against his actual profits. 
The lower CFTC burden of proof enables more elaborate, more in-
depth, and more creative economic and empirical approaches.  With 
proportionally less emphasis on the subjective state of intent, the new 
recklessness standard denotes greater willingness to consider objective 
indicia of manipulation. Although the law has always made use of 
empirical proofs in manipulation, it has done so grudgingly at times. The 
new rules create new reasons and opportunities for the law to make use of 
economic expertise. 
C. Screens at the Pleading Stage197 
Many argued that our pre-existing manipulation laws were sufficient 
to address the challenges manipulation poses.  For example, Pirrong 
implied that the faults in Commodity Exchange Act enforcement came 
largely from the unwillingness of the courts and agencies to engage in 
statistical analysis of prices—but that the law itself was sufficient.
198
  One 
student note examining Libor recommended cosmetic changes to the 
BBA’s Libor governance, but saw no need for legal recommendations,
199
 
and another note surveyed manipulation scholarship in the wake of the 
Sumitomo copper manipulation and argued that existing laws should 
suffice.
200
  For those who were content with the status quo, Dodd-Frank has 
created open season for manipulation enforcement and given regulators too 
much power. 
While the new rules extend their reach to cover transactions that 
would have eluded enforcement before, there are also concerns about the 
power of the dramatic expansion of regulatory authority under Dodd-Frank.  
Just as the Rules will require economic methods to operate, their dizzying 
scope should be limited by broad application of these methods at the 
pleading stage.  With new recklessness and attempt prongs, many more 
defendants can be drawn into investigation and litigation.  The defensive 
use of econometric tools will prove vital for innocent defendants who seek 
to avoid suit.  Ideally, the courts will be receptive to such approaches, 
 
 197.  This section extends analysis in Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Design and Implementation 
of Screens and Their Use by Defendants, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., 
Sept. 2, 2011. 
 198.  Pirrong, supra note 50. 
 199.  Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limbo; A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 365 (2009). 
 200.  Benjamin E. Kozinn, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a 
Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243 (2000). 
VERSTEIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:57 PM 
2013] REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW 415 
 
allowing economic proof at the pleading stages as defendants advert to 
Iqbal and Twombly.  As discussed in Abrantes-Metz (2010), some of these 
patterns may indeed be sufficiently unusual as to pass the higher standards 
for pleading antitrust conspiracy claims set forth by the Supreme Court 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
201
  This section urges that the 
failure to trigger any screen may be useful to a court in determining 
whether a plaintiff has pled with sufficient specificity to overcome 
Twombly. 
If, by contrast, courts allow their unfettered use by the Commission 
and plaintiffs, the new rules could see substantial costs and risks for 
legitimate market participants and lower the quality and liquidity of price 
discovery and hedging.  Concerns were voiced by a number of market 
participants and experts in comments submitted during the rule-making 
period for sections 180.1-180.2, expressing worries about the proposed 
rules.  The American Bar Association emphasized that the addition of the 
OTC swap market to the scope of the manipulation rules makes it all the 
more important that rules be clear.  Unlike market-based participants, OTC 
participants do not yet have real-time feedback from the Commission or 
exchange as to the legality of their activities.
202
 
Platts’s comment, for instance, focused on its role providing price 
discovery and the ways in which the proposed rules against price 
manipulation could potentially create a disincentive to the entities that 
provide Platts with information, hindering its data gathering activities.  
Argus’s comment was straightforwardly critical.  Argus is a major provider 
of price information on various physical commodities. Its concern was that 
“the proposed rules may unnecessarily chill the voluntary submission of 
transaction related data by market participants to compilers of price 
indices.”
203
  As Platts put it, “[e]ffective price discovery in physical energy 
markets depends on the willingness of companies to recognize the 
collective good of engaging in price formation through the voluntary and 
transparent reporting of trade data, including bids, offers and actual 
transactions, to publishers of price assessments such as Platts.”
204
  Platts 
also indicated that the good faith exception for false reporting that exists 
 
 201.  550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). 
 202.  A.B.A. Derivatives Section Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2 at 4; 
William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a 
Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 112 (1995) (“United States futures 
exchanges are much more heavily regulated than the markets for OTC derivatives.”); 
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 
MD. L. REV. 1, 55 (1996) (discussing regulation of swaps). 
 203.  Argus comment on Rules 180.1 and 180.2, at 1. 
 204.  Platts Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2, at 1. 
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under Dodd Frank had a long and successful provenance, dating back to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 2003 Policy Statement on 
Natural Gas and Electric Price Indices, and successfully argued for its 
similar application here.
205
 
Though the outer reaches of the new rule’s power is extensive, its true 
reach will depend on judicial treatment.  In particular, courts may be 
inclined to moderate its power at the pleading stage.  If legitimate market 
participants can dispense with the cost of litigating CEA claims before 
those expenses mount, than much of the uncertainty and cost will be 
relieved.
206
 
We describe below the process of developing a new screen for the 
purpose of evaluating a purported manipulation.  Innovative screens like 
this one can help particularly at the pleading stage.  If the plaintiff’s 
manipulation claim can be cheaply and efficiently discredited, then more 
resources can be dedicated to meritorious claims and innocent defendants 
can avoid serious costs.  The use of these tools will be more important than 
ever in establishing limits to the power of the new rules. 
Innovations in screens, typically driven by litigation parties, can, if 
credited in court, constitute genuine improvements in how and what legal 
factfinders can know.  Party innovations can also drive the creation of tools 
that are subsequently added to the arsenal of tools for prosecuting financial 
manipulation by regulators.  Given their tremendous complexity, 
commodity manipulation will often require the development of new screens 
specifically tailored to the allegations at hand.  Below we provide a closing 
descriptive summary of the many uses that can be made of screens. 
D. Uses of Screens 
A screen is a statistical test aimed at identifying potential market 
misconduct.  Its uses are many, but non-litigation detection and litigation 
are the primary families of uses. 
1. Detection 
Perhaps the primary use that is made of screens is detection.
207
  
 
 205.  Platts Comment Letter on Rules 180.1 and 180.2 at 2. 
 206.  One important factor to note in adjudicating between the promise and overbreadth 
of the new CFTC rules is the argument of Keith Hylton that pleading standards should 
depend on the evidentiary demands and social costs of a given form of litigation.  See Keith 
N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary 
Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (2008). 
 207.  Below we provide examples using just one kind of screen that one of the co-
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Detection involves employing a screen to identify a potential manipulation, 
as was discussed in depth above.  Detection is of use to multiple 
individuals impacted or interested in potential market manipulations.  
Competition authorities and government regulators will want to make 
extensive use of screens to ease the work of identifying potential 
manipulations requiring regulatory scrutiny.  Academics interested in the 
issue will want to employ them, as will enterprising plaintiffs who want to 
corroborate their case.
208
  Further afield are additional uses for screens.  
Companies considering prospective joint ventures or mergers and 
acquisitions stand to benefit from identifying potential liabilities.  Self-
regulatory authorities, whether industry wide or specific, may also want to 
use screens in monitoring their members.  Lastly, corporate internal 
compliance stands to benefit enormously from well-applied screens, which 
may nip forthcoming manipulations in the bud. 
2. Litigation 
The other primary forum for the effective and efficient use of screens 
is in litigation.
209
  Every constituent of the litigation process will benefit 
from the apt use of screens.  Screens are often used, as discussed above, for 
identifying potential manipulation and can be aggressively utilized at the 
pleading and proof stage. Importantly, though, screens can also be used to 
exonerate innocent defendants, potentially at each of these stages. In both 
cases, it is the factfinder that also benefits from the appropriate use of 
statistical evidence.  Moreover, this is true at unexpected phases of an 
action.  Class certification and damages will also potentially benefit from 
screen application.
210
 
CONCLUSION 
The law of commodities manipulation has been definitionally 
 
authors has also successfully employed.  See, e.g., Cindy Durtschi, William Hillison & Carl 
Pacini, The Effective Use of Benford’s Law to Assist in Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data, 
5 J. FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 17 (2004); Hal Varian, Benford’s Law, 26:3 AM. STATISTICIAN 
65 (1972); Stephen Battersby, Statistics Hint at Fraud in Iranian Election, NEW SCIENTIST, 
June 24, 2009, at 10. 
 208.  Abrantes-Metz, Screens for Conspiracies and their Multiple Applications, supra 
note 176; Rosa Abrantes-Metz et al, Is the Market Being Fooled? An Error-Based Screen 
for Manipulation (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 
3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007348. 
 209.  Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Why and How to Use Empirical Screens in Antitrust 
Compliance, COMPETITION POLICY INT. J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 210.  Abrantes-Metz, supra note 176. 
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confused, doctrinally challenged, and nearly unwinnable in practice.  In the 
aftermath of a disastrous global financial crisis, the CFTC has adopted a 
new set of regulations of striking scope and depth.  This Article analyzed 
the tectonic shift those regulations represented for the legal landscape and 
made three primary claims.  First, manipulation in financial markets 
increasingly requires powerful tools for detection and prosecution.  The 
inclusion of swaps within the CEA manipulation regime, and the 
worldwide focus on Libor, underscores that the new CFTC rules have 
dramatic advantages alongside their significant potential for abuse.  
Second, that the new CFTC rules require more complex, subtle, and 
innovative economic analyses.  While engaging the debate at a theoretical 
level, we also provided extensive demonstrations of how a sophisticated 
economic approach might work under the new law.  Third, we argued for 
an increased role for empiricism in the evidentiary law surrounding 
manipulation, re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place of economic 
analyses in the law. 
 
